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Preface 
 
In March 2007, the Technical Committee on System Safety (TCSS) under the IEEE 
System Society held its first international workshop on issues relating to safety of 
systems of national and global significance. The workshop provided an open working 
forum to contribute to the goal of obtaining a holistic view of system safety for a better 
understanding of the system safety discipline.  Because technical societies contain 
expertise in various slices of the discipline of system safety, obtaining both the big 
picture and coordination among the separate initiatives is difficult to achieve in any one 
specific society.  We envision the workshop becoming a unique integrating forum for 
researchers and practitioners to discuss the practical issues associated with safety of 
systems. 
 
The call for participation included the following list of topics: 
 
 Safety engineering of systems-of-systems; 
 Building a safety culture and management of safety; 
 Education and teaching materials; 
 Safety Standards; 
 Ethics; 
 Competency of safety practitioners; 
 Human factors and ergonomics including psychological aspects of safety; 
 Assessment of safety and development of safety cases; 
 Development of the safety requirements to identify the safety functions to be 
performed and identification of the safety integrity of the various safety functions; 
 Hazard analysis and risk assessment techniques as a basis of the development of 
the safety requirements specification; 
 Design and implementation considerations; 
 Modeling and formal methods of assurance including accident modeling; 
 Effective and appropriate use of tools 
 
The attendees provided input on the following questions: 
 
What are some of the fundamental knowledge barriers for safety of systems today? 
 How to measure safety, security, and other ilities for stovepipe and system of 
systems 
 How to make weightings explicit for tradeoff analysis, and are those the correct 
weights 
 Need for both concepts and definitions to be understood by safety, security, and 
other communities 
 We are unable to describe uncertainty in common terms 
 Misunderstanding of what standards provide 
 Practitioner competence 
 Realistic expectations on practitioners 
 Risk management, such as how to model security problems 
vii
   
 Understanding the roles and responsibilities of each discipline, and how they fit 
together 
 What decisions are we trying to support from our analyses of systems 
 
What are some of the fundamental limitations for safety of systems today? 
 A mindset of evolving vice building dependable systems 
 Influences of organizational culture and established work practices 
 Problem-solving approaches resulting in unnecessarily complex systems 
 Lack of integration among policy, guidance (how to do it), standards and 
compliance enforcement 
 Defining the system boundary 
 Lack of codification within standards 
 Unknowns:  very large number of possible vulnerabilities, hazards, etc. 
 Incentives are not congruent with the risks; identify what causes those factors to 
be in the decision formula (not defined in the standards today) 
 System integration is done poorly, partly due to the lack of tool support 
 Turf issues, such as between IEEE technical committees, societies, and councils 
 
What are the most important research challenges? 
 There needs to be an as-is report of the safety and security domains 
 Create the to-be report for both the safety and security domains, including the 
mission and sustainment domain 
 Perform the gap analysis 
 Assurance cases 
 Automation support for building and analysis of architectures on an ility-basis 
 Composition of systems into system of systems, including across organizations 
 How do you specify uncertainty for security? 
 Establish a sub grand challenge on dependability 
 
What are promising innovations and abstractions for building future high-confidence 
safety systems? 
 Assurance cases that are usable across domains 
 Tools interoperability:  tools that reuse existing data rather than rely on translating 
data between tools, analyses, etc. 
 Formalize system of systems engineering techniques, concepts, etc. 
 Formalize the as-is availability and data trades between safety and security 
 Formally codify precepts (programmatic, design, operations guidelines) for both 
safety and security, and cross compare 
 Encourage IEEE headquarters to foster cooperation across societies, councils, 
technical committees to address system dependability 
 Encourage the IEEE Computer Society, International System Safety Society, and 
RAMS to re-establish joint conferences between safety and security; for 




   
What are possible milestones for the next 5 years? 
 Finalize the 
o As-is report of the safety and security domains 
o To-be report for both the safety and security domains, including the 
mission and sustainment domain 
o Gap analysis 
 Standards on assurance that span safety, security and other aspects of 
dependability, such as ISO/IEC 15026, and safety standards such as AOP 52 and 
MIL-STD-882 
 Have a outline (or roadmap) of the body of knowledge—provide help to the 
engineering, program manager and others on how to and what to apply develop 
dependable systems 
 Making the accreditation more standard and visible 
 Have a body of knowledge for assurance, in addition have a breakdown of skill 
sets against roles 
 Have cooperation with the IEEE Product Safety Engineering Society and other 
societies to build a safety-security accreditation program 
 
What are possible milestones for the next 5-to-10 years? 
 Risk-decisions are made across all types of risk, risks throughout the lifecycle 
 User high-quality software engineering methodologies 
 Meet much higher expectations for dependability of systems (i.e., ultra-high 
dependability)—raise the bar 
 
What in the near term can IEEE do for the attendees of the workshop and members of 
the technical meeting? 
 Establish avenues for members of the community of interest (COI) on 
dependability to share ideas and documents 
 Establish a column editor for Security & Privacy, Software, or some other IEEE 
magazine to address the role between security and safety, with articles being on 
the order of 2000 words 
 
In addition, the attendees of the workshop provided input to the TCSS roadmap.  
Suggested themes for the next workshop included the following: 
 Applying autonomic and biological computing (e.g., swarms) to address safety 
and security 
 Certification of systems and people 
 Roadmap—address what was brought up during the first workshop 
 Relate safety and security to one another in the system-dependability context 
 Look into processes 
 Facilitation of communication between security and safety practitioners 
 
The attendees also recommended that the technical committee do the following: 
 Identify interests of TC members 
 Start a reading list 
ix
   
 Encourage weekly posting of definitions and concepts for feedback—set up a 
wiki for the TC 
 Invite papers that address integration of safety and security 
 Put together a panel:  Can safety and security be hooked up:  Is there any 
relationship between the two 
 
The next workshop will be held in conjunction with the Second Annual IEEE Systems 
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Summary of Position Papers 
 
Selected Issues in Computer Systems Safety: Position Paper, Andrew J. Kornecki, 
Janusz Zalewski 
 
This paper addresses the role of software in system safety, where the application of 
computers or programmable devices may put the users or public at risk. 
 
To make significant progress inventing and innovating in the area of safety assessment 
and assurance there will need to be a corresponding level of funding to similar to steps 
taken a few years ago to sponsor security research.  
 
The way the present authors see progress made possible in the next 5-10 years is via a 
significant coordinated effort of respective government agencies and industrial sectors. It 
should be made clear to the decision makers that if cost minimization will continue to be 
an essential factor in safety-related industries, then we may soon experience the kind of 
failures which were caused not so long ago by breaches in security. 
 
Subject Introduction, Archibald McKinlay 
 
This introduction is background for three papers which require a similar introduction: 
 Hooking into Systems Engineering 
 Systems Safety Engineering HR 
 Systems Safety in new Architecture and Technologies 
Unlike Systems Safety Engineering, little has been done to incorporate software 
requirements and risk management into Systems Engineering.  There needs to be a 
holistic systems integration approach to the updating of Systems Engineering to re-
integrate Systems Safety Engineering, Systems Assurance and Security, and Software 
Engineering.  The DoD has efforts in-work to update the Systems Engineering Plan 
(SEP) but it will be a year more before it is finished. 
 
Each added discipline required a change in the typical engineer’s abilities, education and 
experience.  The advancing technologies must be viewed in the same model.  When a  
safe system is taken and simply attached to the Internet for monitoring the safety risk 
changes, and changes in ways that are not obvious to the traditional Software Safety or 
Systems Safety Engineer.  The technologies are changing so fast that systems are being 
built right now without the updated training, education, or toolkit being available because 
neither the chip nor the interface existed at the project’s start. 
 
Systems Engineering must return to the roots of risk management and use that to 
maintain focus in prioritizing tasks in all schedules, meetings and budgets. Like Systems 
Safety was made to absorb occupational and then environmental tasks, so also must 
Systems Engineering reconnect to its many children. All children must coordinate 




   
Safety and Security in Software Engineering, Samuel T. Redwine, Jr. 
 
Today, security is a concern for most systems as software has become central to the 
functioning of organizations and physical systems with much of it directly or indirectly 
exposed to the Internet or to insider attack as well as to subversion during development, 
deployment, and updating. Though safety-oriented systems so exposed now must also 
face the security problem, often traditional computing  safety engineering does not 
address maliciousness and its perverse effect on probabilistic analyses. 
 
One can write requirements for safety and security that look quite similar in form. When 
both safety and security are required, a number of areas are candidates for combining 
safety and security engineering concerns including: goals or claims including sub-goals 
or subclaims, constraints on system behavior,  principles, solutions,  activities and 
processes, assurance cases, correctness and evaluations and certifications. 
 
In recent years, the software safety community has been more advanced in its thinking 
and has more examples of successful experience with producing high-confidence 
software than does the software security community. The safety community’s experience 
provides lessons for software security practitioners, but the traditional engineering safety 
problem differs from the security one in a critical way—it  presumes non-existence of 
maliciousness. 
 
Competency Software Safety Requirements for Navy Engineers, Brian Scannell, Paul 
Dailey 
 
The Navy currently has no formal certification for Safety Engineers concentrating in 
software safety.  NOSSA has led an effort to educate personnel regarding the 
development and support of Naval Weapon Systems.  The WISE training tool is a step in 
the right direction, but further formal training is needed to support experience in software 
safety.  There is a need to evade the case of untrained software safety engineers that are 
arbitrarily appointed tasks. This should not be based on education or experience alone but 
rather a combination of experience, education, and certification.  A documented 
certification process will only improve systems required to be safe that depend on 
software.  There are several options to obtain a solid software and systems safety 
background for Navy applications. 
 
 Formal training is important, and provides a good foundation for software safety.  In 
addition, certified software safety engineers should also have a mentor assigned to them, 








   
Biologically-Inspired Concepts for Autonomic Self-Protection in Multiagent 
Systems, Roy Sterritt, Mike Hinchey 
 
Biologically-inspired autonomous and autonomic systems (AAS) are essentially 
concerned with creating self-directed and self-managing systems based on metaphors 
from nature and the human body, such as the autonomic nervous system. Agent 
technologies have been identified as a key enabler for engineering autonomy and 
autonomicity in systems, both in terms of retrofitting into legacy systems and in 
designing new systems. Handing over responsibility to systems themselves raises 
concerns for humans with regard to safety and security.  
 
Autonomic agents have been gaining ground as a significant approach to facilitate the 
creation of self-managing systems to deal with the ever increasing complexity and costs 
inherent in today’s and tomorrow’s systems. 
 
In terms of the Autonomic Systems initiative, agent technologies have the potential to 
become an intrinsic approach within the initiative , not only as an enabler, but also in 
terms of creating autonomic agent environments. 
 
Toward a Unified Safety/Security Model, Gary Stoneburner 
 
The worlds of safety and security have co-existed for some time, yet remain largely 
separate domains with limited interactions.  This is, to put it mildly, a problem.  Each 
domain has contributions for the other and more dependable systems being a significant 
benefit of working together.  Yet one element that has continued to separate these 
domains is lack of a common language and taxonomy for discussing risks associated with 
safety and with security.   
 
Both safety and security have much to gain by working together. Security can piggy-back 
on the work done within the safety community in developing definitions and terminology 
to express hazard conditions and in establishing organizational awareness of the need to 
trade function for other, important concerns.  The safety community can take advantage 
of the work done by security in dealing with intelligent maliciousness which is not well 
addressed by the probabilistic assumptions that underlie safety processes and yet is now a 
significant concern with regard to safety.  A risk framework has been proposed to help 
make the idea of working together more than just an idea, but a reality. 
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Selected Issues in Computer Systems Safety: 
Position Paper 
 
Andrew J. Kornecki  
Dept. of Computer & Software Engineering 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 




 Computer Science Department 
Florida Gulf Coast University 





The position paper presents the authors’ views 
on the critical issues in safety of computer systems 
and software.  It is based on selected results from 
several studies the authors have done for various 
government agencies, private companies and 
professional societies. Main limitations and 
challenges in designing computer systems for 




System safety is a very broad term and books 
have been written on various aspects of safety 
analysis and safety assurance [1,2].  In this position 
paper, we are focusing in particular on various 
aspects of computer safety, especially the role of 
software in system safety, where the application of 
computers or programmable devices may put the 
users or public at risk.  The authors’ experience 
comes mostly from research related to aviation, air 
transportation and space, but partially also from 
research on medical, automotive and nuclear 
devices and technologies. However they by no 
means claim that the treatment of the subject is 
complete and exhaustive. 
In a broader sense, to evaluate safety of a 
computer product, especially the software product 
that is used in a safety critical system, one has to 
take a closer look at a product itself, but also at the 
way it has been developed, as well as at the way the 
tools for developing this product have been created.  
This logic is illustrated in Figure 1, and is very 
different from the traditional approaches to system 
safety, where the analysis is limited only to the 
product and the related application environment. 
The examples come from the recent study on 
the assessment of software development tools for 
safety-critical real-time systems conducted for the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) [3]. 
Modern commercial development tools are 
typically complex suites combining multiple 
functionalities. Considering tool complexity, the 
quality of support materials is often marginal. 
Unless developers become expertly proficient with 
the tool, reliance on it may lead to ignorance of tool 
functionality, complacency and thus compromise 
the safety of developed system. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Context for Evaluating Computer Products. 
 
2. Limitations and Knowledge Barriers 
 
What are the three fundamental limitations and 
knowledge barriers for safety of systems today? 
 
From the computer use and software standpoint, 
there are several issues that obstruct progress in 
dealing with safety.  The most important among 
them seem to be the following: 
1) Limited understanding of computers and 
software by safety engineers and, vice versa, 
limited understanding of safety issues by 
computer and software engineers. 
2) Very confusing state of safety standards and 
guidelines, and proliferation of sometimes 
contradicting guidelines. This situation 
results in the sheer number of documents the 
safety critical system developers must be 
aware of. 
3) Lack of well-defined, measurable safety 
metrics is another fundamental limitation to 
progress in safety assurance.  
 
Our studies based on the safety related software 
guidelines in civil aviation DO-178B [4] indicated 
that the criteria used in this and other safety related 
standards do not include solid theoretical 
underpinnings to be used as measures of metrics for 
safety. This is a significant impediment in product 
qualification and certification [5]. 
1
      
3.  Research Challenges 
 
What are the three most important research 
challenges? 
 
As it stands right now, even agreeing on the 
state of the art and practice in computer and 
software safety research would be difficult.  One 
important step forward would be to produce a 
document defining the body of knowledge in 
computer system safety, similar to the one 
produced for security [6].  This would help 
establish the common ground, from which further 
steps could be possibly defined.  The challenges 
that researchers are facing in this respect, come 
from at least the following: 
1) Lack of specific data typically available 
from industrial projects, since the industry 
does not share this type of data due to the 
competitive advantage. 
2) Common-off-the-shelf components (COTS), 
both hardware and software, are going to be 
increasingly used in safety critical systems, 
but very few studies have been done how to 
approach their safety assessment. 
3) New technologies will proliferate, both in 
hardware, such as high speed databuses [7], 
and software, such as automatic code 
generation [8], for the analysis of which new 
research methods and approaches will have 
to be created. 
 
From the perspective of our studies, a critical 
issue for vendors and government agencies was the 
necessity of certification based on solid 
experimental data.  However, the qualification data 
collected from experiments constitute a component 
of the certification package and are highly 
proprietary.  This situation puts researchers in a 
very disadvantageous position.  Some relevant 
discussions how to address this and similar issues, 
have recently taken place at the Tools Forum [8]. 
 
4.  Promising Innovations 
 
What are promising innovations and 
abstractions for building future high-confidence 
safety systems? 
 
It is extremely difficult to determine, which 
specific techniques or technologies are the most 
innovative or make the best promise, mostly 
because their suitability and usefulness have to be 
proved over time and a range of applications.  
However, a few essential directions in innovation 
can be mentioned [9]: 
1) Improvement of quality and trustworthiness 
of products and tools via advances in 
verification and validation, possibly via the 
application of formal approaches, such as 
model checking, has been already in a view 
of researches for some two decades and is 
still making a promise. 
2) Design diversity as an essential technique in 
improving computer and software safety has 
been used successfully for years and will 
remain to be used as one of the most 
effective safety techniques thus far. 
3) Several newer technologies emerged over 
the recent years, of which we mention only 
two: model based development and active 
safety systems. 
4) Present authors’ own research based on the 
concepts of a safety shell [10] and Bayesian 
belief networks [11] has also a potential to 
improve safety in an array of applications. 
 
It seems that a significant progress to develop 
new innovative technologies for safety assessment 
and assurance may not be possible without some 
major concentrated effort towards funding 
respective research.  This should be an effort 
similar to steps taken a few years ago to sponsor 
security research. The scale of funding should be 
such that development of innovative solutions 
would be truly possible.  For comparison, it is 
worthwhile mentioning that the European 
Commission has recently provided over Є3M of 
funding for a joint university-industry project on 
active system safety [12]. 
 
5.  Possible Milestones and Conclusion 
 
 What are possible milestones for the next 5-to-
10 years? 
 
 The way the present authors see progress made 
possible in the next 5-10 years is via a significant 
coordinated effort of respective government 
agencies and industrial sectors, driven by the 
following three factors: 
1) Setting priorities in research directions, for 
example to define and verify measurable 
safety metrics. 
2) Establishing educational preferences to 
design and implement changes in the 
computing curricula as well as by offering 
respective training for safety engineers. 
3) Enforcing qualification and certification 
processes, so that industry would become 
better aware how their respective products 
and activities will undergo thorough but 
transparent assessment. 
 
Certainly, all this requires a significant increase 
in the level of funding, which may not be possible 
without decisive legislative actions.  It should be 
made clear to the decision makers that if cost 
minimization will continue to be an essential factor 
in safety related industries, then we may soon 
experience the kind of failures which were caused 
not so long ago by breaches in security. 
2




 This project was supported in part by the 
Aviation Airworthiness Center of Excellence 
(AACE) under contract DTFA-0301C00048 
sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA). Findings contained herein are not 
necessarily those of the FAA.  J. Zalewski 
acknowledges additional support from the Florida 





[1] Redmill F. (Ed.), Dependability of Critical 
Computer Systems, Vol. 1 & 2, Elsevier 
Applied Science, London, 1988/89 
[2] Leveson N.G., Safeware – System Safety and 
Computers, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 
1995 
[3] Kornecki A.J., J. Zalewski, Experimental 
Evaluation of Software Development Tools for 
Safety-Critical Real-Time Systems, 
Innovations in Systems and Software 
Engineering – A NASA Journal, Vol. 1, pp. 
176-188, 2005 
[4] RTCA, Software Considerations in Airborne 
Systems and Equipment Certification, Report 
RTCA/DO-178B, Washington, DC, 1992 
[5] Kornecki A., J. Zalewski, The Qualification of 
Software Development Tools from the DO-
178B Certification Perspective, CrossTalk – 
The Journal of Defense Software Engineering, 
Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 19-22, April 2006 
[6] Redwine, Jr., S.T (Ed.), Secure Software 
Assurance: A Guide to the Common Body of 
Knowledge to Produce, Acquire, and Sustain 
Secure Software, Draft Version 0.9. U.S. 
Departments of Homeland Security and 
Defense, January 2006 
[7] Kornecki A., J. Zalewski, J. Sosnowski, D. 
Trawczynski, A Study on Avionics and 
Automotive Databus Safety Evaluation, The 
Archives of Transport, Vo. 17, No. 3-4, pp. 
107-132, 2005 
[8] Software Tools Forum, Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, FL, 
May 18-19, 2004, URL: http://www.erau.edu/ 
 db/campus/softwaretoolsforum.html 
[9] Zalewski J., W. Ehrenberger, F. Saglietti, J. 
Gorski, A. Kornecki, Safety of Computer 
Control Systems:  Challenges and Results in 
Software Development, Annual Reviews in 








[10] Sahraoui A.E.K., E. Anderson, J. van Katwijk, 
J. Zalewski, Formal Specification of a Safety 
Shell in Real-Time Control Practice, Proc. 
25th IFAC/IFIP Workshop on Real-Time 
Programming, Mallorca, Spain, May 15-19, 
2000, pp. 117-123 
[11] Zalewski J., A.J. Kornecki, H. Pfister,  
Numerical Assessment of Software 
Development Tools in Safety-Critical Systems 
Using Bayesian Belief Networks, Proc.  Int’l 
Multiconference on Computer Science and 
Information Technology, Wisła, Poland, 
November 6-10, 2006, pp. 433-442. 
[12] ONBASS – An Onboard Active Safety 






Dr. Andrew J. Kornecki is a Professor at the Dept. 
of Computer and Software Engineering, Embry 
Riddle Aeronautical University. He has over 
twenty years of research and teaching experience in 
areas of real-time computer systems. He 
contributed to research on intelligent simulation 
training systems, safety-critical software systems, 
and served as a visiting researcher with the FAA. 
He has been conducting industrial training on real-
time safety-critical software in medical and 
aviation industries and for the FAA Certification 
Services.  Recently he has been engaged in work on 
certification issues and assessment of development 
tools for real-time safety-critical systems.  He is 
currently, with Dr. Zalewski, conducting a study on 
tool qualification for complex electronic hardware, 
sponsored by the FAA. 
 
Dr. Janusz Zalewski is a Professor of Computer 
Science and Engineering at Florida Gulf Coast 
University.  Before taking a university position, he 
worked for various nuclear research labs, including 
the Data Acquisition Group of Superconducting 
Super Collider and Computer Safety and Reliability 
Center of Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory.  He also worked on projects and 
consulted for a number of private companies, 
including Lockheed Martin, Harris, and Boeing. He 
served as a Chairman of IFIP Working Group 5.4 
on Industrial Software Quality and of an IFAC TC 
on Safety of Computer Control Systems. His major 
research interests include safety-related real-time 
computer systems.  He currently works with Dr. 
Kornecki on a study for the FAA on tool 
qualification for complex electronic hardware. 
 
3




Embry Riddle Aeronautical University




Florida Gulf Coast University
Fort Myers, FL 33965, USA
zalewski@fgcu.edu
http://www.fgcu.edu/zalewski/
Page 2© 2005 by Andrew Kornecki and Janusz Zalewski
Lecture Outline
1) Fundamental Concepts





6) Case Studies & Summary
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System Safety: Dependability
•Dependability is the property of the system that 
justifies reliance on its services 
{more on the topic: “Dependability: Basic Concepts and Terminology”, 
Edited by Laprie, J.-C., Springer Verlag, 1992,   ISBN: 3-211-82296-8}
•Dependability is encapsulation of the following 
properties/abilities {adapted from Laprie}:
– Reliability - probability to function correctly over a 
given period of time
– Security - ability to prevent unauthorized access and 
system damage
– Safety - ability of not harming people and not cause 
property damage
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System Safety: Dependability
Dependability involves:
•Attributes - the metrics for evaluation of system
services (safety, reliability, security, availability, 
integrity, maintainability, confidentiality, etc.)
• Impairments - causes or results of lack of 
dependability (error, fault, failure)
•Means - the methods used to deliver dependable 
services (fault prevention, removal, detection, 
tolerance)
5
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System Safety: Dependability
Relationships among Reliability, 
Safety and Security Attributes
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System Safety: Dependability
Reliability – failure does not lead to severe 
consequences (high risk) to the environment or 
computer system, nevertheless improving the 
failure rate is of principal concern
Safety – failure leads to severe consequences 
(high risk) to the environment (and possibly to 
computer)
Security – failure leads to severe consequences 
to the computer system (and possibly to the 
environment)
6
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System Safety: Dependability
Example of dependability issues in 
a car embedded control software:
Reliability – ignition control, cruise 
control, fuel gauge, odometer, etc.
Safety – air bag, seat belts control, 
anti-lock brakes, etc.
Security – door locks, alarms, etc.






 Reliability involves bottom-up activities focusing 
on system failures
 Safety involves top-down approach 
concentrating on system hazards
System Safety: Dependability
7
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System Safety: Basic Terms
•Safety is a characteristic of a system ensuring that it 
will not endanger human life, property or environment
•Safety-critical software system is a software 
intensive system involved in assuring that safety of 
equipment or plant it is interfacing with is not 
compromised
•Software Safety is achieved by implementing features
and procedures ensuring that a product performs 
predictably under normal and abnormal conditions so 
the likelihood of unplanned events is minimized and 
their consequences are controlled and contained
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System Safety: Basic Terms
•Hazard is the capability of the system to harm the 
people, destroy the property or environment
•Nature of the hazard defines the way how it works 
and how it can be controlled (radiation, electric 
shock, mechanical break)
•The hazard is a potential danger to do harm during 
the system operation
•The actual occurrences of hazards are incidents
and accidents
8
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System Safety: Basic Terms
•The role of safety features and procedures is to 
ensure safety preventing incidents and accidents
• Incident is an occurrence of a situation that could 
result in a severe consequences (in terms of loss of 
life or property) but it was prevented or the situation 
was kept under control
•Accident is an unplanned event or series of events 
that results in death, injury, environmental or 
material damage
•Both incidents and accidents are exemplifying 
safety violation
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System Safety: Basic Terms
•Severity of hazard describes consequences of 
potential accident (in terms of the human lives 
or monetary value)
•Likelihood of a hazard defines how often can 
we expect the hazard to occur (in terms of how 
many times per time unit)
•Risk is the combined measure of severity and 
likelihood of a hazard – likelihood of hazard 
leading to an accident (combined with hazard 
severity)
9
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System Safety: Basic Terms
•Mistakes are made by people (specification, design, 
coding, manufacturing, etc.)
•Fault is an internal defect within hardware or software 
caused by a mistake, component imperfection, or 
external disturbance (or inability of a function to 
perform a required action)
•Failure is an external view of the system, showing its 
inability to perform required functions
•Error is the difference between computer (observed, 
measured) value and the true (specified or theoretically 
correct) value (it’s a manifestation of a failure)
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System Safety: Basic Terms
Fault propagation cycle
10
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System Safety: Basic Terms
Recursive nature 
of software faults
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System Safety: Basic Terms
•Mistakes made by people (“errare humanum est”) 
are the primary reasons that “something went wrong”
•Failure is when the system fails to perform its 
required function in the operational phase 
•Failure can be caused by:
–user makes how-to-use mistake
–fault (or defect) within the hardware
–fault (or bug) within the software
NOTE: Keep in mind that safety may be compromised 
when no failure occurs.
11
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System Safety: What went wrong?
•How-to-use mistake is more likely to happen 
because:
– of user mistake during analysis or training
– the product is imperfect (too complex, difficult to use, 
poor diagnostics)
– there is a fault within the software
•Software bug (or imperfect product) is due to the 
developer’s mistake
•Hardware defect is due to:
– designer’s mistake
– manufacturer’s mistake
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•Environmental and operating conditions (disabling 
interrupts may lead to failing an interrupt driven safety 
critical function)
•Logic control by Real Time Executive (order of 
processing may impact the failure conditions)
•System function calls (detailed understanding their 
operations and side-effects is critical)
•System resources (implicit use of memory in stack ops)
•Timing (deadlines, jitter, or drift may prove dangerous)
•Software architecture (choice of representation may 
impact safety)
System Safety: What went wrong?
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•Most of development methods do not provide 
guarantee that timing constraints be met, thus 
verification of timing requirements is carried out after 
writing the code 
•Such approach can be costly because of late fault 
detection and need to re-write the code for speed 
•Defining timing requirements can be ambiguous, 
thus notations allowing formally analyze or animate 
the system model are recommended
•Safety requirements must be traceable through the 
progression of the product artifacts (requirements => 
design => code => operation)
System Safety: What went wrong?
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System Safety: Techniques
Safety Techniques basically 
fall into two broad categories:
Design Techniques
(to improve the product)
Process Techniques
(to improve the process)
13
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System Safety: Design Techniques
Major architectural safety techniques:
–redundancy - using multiple components 
to carry the same task
–diversity - two components (channels, 
systems) to carry the same task are 
based on different technologies 
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Principle of a Safety Shell
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System Safety: Design Techniques













Guards Incorporated into a Safety Shell
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System Safety: Process Techniques
Safety Lifecycle according to IEC 61508:
• IEC 61508 is a standard for the life-cycle 
management of Instrumented Protection Systems –
it formalizes a risk-based approach to establishing 
target Safety Integrity Levels  (SIL ) and assessing 
if systems meet these targets
• IEC 61508: “The necessary activities involving 
safety-related systems, occurring during a 
period of time that starts at the concept phase 
of a project and finishes when any safety-
related systems are no longer available for use”
15
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System Safety: Process Techniques
IEC 61508 
Safety Lifecycle
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System Safety: Process Techniques
 Hazard Operability Analysis (HAZOP)
 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
 Failure Mode and Effect Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA)
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
 Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
 Common Mode Failure Analysis (CMF)
 Cause Consequence Diagrams (CCD)
 Petri Nets
16
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Real-Time Programming
Basic Concepts
•Concurrency and basic program properties
•Programming language features
•Real-Time kernel features
•Timing issues in real-time programs
•Practical aspects of real-time scheduling 
•Board Support Packages & Device Drivers
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• TASK - a unit of concurrency executing sequentially
itself, designed to fulfill a specific system function, 
typically defined by:
• event - environmental or internal stimulus occurring at
a time point requiring response
• activity - a set of operations responding to the event 
requiring time
• Task can be implemented as:
• PROCESS - a virtual computing environment set up to 
run as an application program (contains its own data, 
code, context, & resources)
• THREAD - a sequence of instructions executed within 
the context of a process
Real-Time Programming: Concurrency
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Real-Time Programming: Concurrency
States of Concurrent Tasks









 Safety and Liveness
 Scheduling
18
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Real-Time Programming: Concurrency
10-task example of concurrent execution
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Real-Time Programming: Concurrency
19
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Real-Time Programming: Concurrency
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Real-Time Programming: Concurrency
20
Page 35© 2005 by Andrew Kornecki and Janusz Zalewski
Real-Time Programming: Concurrency
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• An informal scan of the real-time (embedded, 
dedicated, safety-critical) market reveals:
– 30% assembly and legacy languages
– 30% Ada
– 30% C/C++ 
– 10% other (100+ other languages)
• C and Ada are the most commonly used languages 
in civil aviation today
• C++ is gaining popularity, but its usage is still limited
Real-Time Programming: Languages
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Real-Time Programming: Languages
Language Safety Features:
• Formally defined syntax;  Block structure
• Strong typing;  Wild (unstructured) jumps
• Memory overwrites;  Memory exhaustion
• Dangling pointers;  Variable initialization
• Model of floating-point arithmetic
• Exception handling;  Reentrancy
• Separate compilation with cross-checking
• Temporal predictability of loops
Efforts include:  SPARK, MISRA-C, PEARL.
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Real-Time Programming: Languages
Strong Typing – strict application od data 
type checking rules to prfevent misuse of 
variables and data
int a:
float x; // and x are of  different types
a = x; // formally, this is incorrect,
// but C/C++ may allow it
a = (int)x; // mode appropriate coding
Fortran allows implicit declarations
C/C++ and Java allow implicit type casting
Ada requires explicit type casting
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Real-Time Programming: Languages
Exception – an unexpected situation that may 
cause a program to crash.
Examples: division by 0, overflow, reference to 
nonexisting object (memory, device), I/O error, 
etc.
Exception handling – to provide facilities within 
a language to neutralize consequences of 
exceptions.
23
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Real-Time Programming: Languages
Usual sequence of actions in exception handling:
1. Exception handler included in a program.
2. Exception raised during program execution.
3. Control is transferred to exception handler.
4. Handler executes and exits to the surrounding 
block.
x := a/b;    -- What if  b=0?
…
exception
when CONSTRAINT_ERROR => x=MaxInt;
end;
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Real-Time Programming: Languages
Unstructured jump (wild jump) – a program jump 
which is not controlled by the programmer.
Unstructured jumps are most likely to occur in 
case statement or their equivalents. 
Examples include:
- incomplete coverage of cases (missing 
default/others)
- erroneous exit from cases (missing break)
- incomplete if/else pairs.
24
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Real-Time Programming: Languages
C/C++ pair setjpm() and longjmp():
int setjump(jmp_buf env)
// Saves state info in env for use by longjmp
void longjmp(jmp_buf  env, int v)
// Restores the state saved by setjmp
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Real-Time Programming: Languages
Memory overwrite – an uncontrolled access to 
arbitrary memory locaations.
May be cause by: erroneous pointers, out-of-
bounds array indexes, dynamic allocation.
The programmer must remember that a pointer 
is not just an address;  it is an address of a data 
item of a certain type.
25
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Real-Time Programming: Languages
// Check memory space available
int * arr , j=0;
for ( ;  ; ) {
j++;
arr = (int *)malloc(TEN_K);
printf(“%d “, j);
}
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Real-Time Programming: Languages
Reentrancy – subprogram property that allows 
it to be executed by multiple callers at the 
same time.
Need for reentrancy is typical in multithreaded 
programs. Therefore library routines are 
usually indicated MT-safe or not.
26




- order of evaluation vs. operator precedence
- spawning processes via fork
- killing concurrent units.
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Real-Time Programming: Languages
// Both should be avoided
x = i++ + a[i];
x = (i++) + a[i];
// What is the result, and why?
int i = 0;
i = i+++i;
27
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Real-Time Programming: Languages
// When if has both branches 
// executed simultaneously!
if  (fork()) {
…  // some code
}
else {
…  // other code
}
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Real-Time Programming: Languages
Beware of problems with 
destroying concurrent units:
- Ada tasks via abort
- Aunix processes via kill()
- threads vi acancellation.
28







Observation: Why Java, as the first programming 
language in common use, included GUI and 
Networking as part of the language?  Do LabVIEW 
and MATLAB show similar trend?
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Concept of RTOS/Kernel Operation:
• Strong distinction between internal system 
operations and the user tasks 
• RTOS kernel does not participate in the priority 
scheme - it operates in the hardware context
• Peripheral interrupts handled by extensions to 
the kernel (device drivers) which also function 
outside normal application task prioritization
Real-Time Programming: RT Kernel
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Concept of RTOS/Kernel Operation:
• User tasks communicate with the kernel and 
perform most I/O through entry points or calls 
into the drivers - I/O is processed outside the 
user application context
• Modern RTOS uses threaded micro-kernel 
with fast response and options for handling 
interrupts at the system priority level
Real-Time Programming: RT Kernel
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Basic Terminology
•EVENT – a result of an externally or internally 
generated occurrence handled by the processor
•LATENCY - time required to recognize and start 
responding to an event
•RESPONSE TIME - time interval between presentation 
of an input (stimulus) and the appearance of the 
associated output (response)
•DEADLINE - a time point before which a specific event 
must occur (e.g. the task must complete the execution) 
Real-Time Programming: RT Kernel
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Basic Terminology
• INTERRUPT LATENCY – the time interval between 
the occurrence of an external event and the start of 
the first instruction of the interrupt service routine
• INTERRUPT LATENCY INVOLVES: hardware logic 
processing, interrupt disable time, handling higher 
hardware priority interrupts, switching to handler 
code (saves, etc.)
Real-Time Programming: RT Kernel
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Basic Terminology
•DISPATCH LATENCY – the time interval between 
the end of interrupt handler code and the first 
instruction of the process activated (made runnable) 
by this interrupt.
•DISPATCH LATENCY INVOLVES: OS decision 
time to reschedule (non-preemptive kernel state), 
context switch time, return from system call.
Real-Time Programming: RT Kernel
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Real-Time Programming: RT Kernel
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Contributions to Interrupt Task Response Time
Real-Time Programming: RT Kernel
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Kernel Responsiveness Involves:
• INTERRUPT LATENCY
• TASK DISPATCH LATENCY
• (WORST CASE) INTERRUPT RESPONSE TIME
(Interrupt Latency + Worst case Execution of 
the Interrupt Handler + Interrupt Exit Overhead)
• INTERRUPT TASK RESPONSE TIME
(Interrupt Response Time + Dispatch Latency)
Real-Time Programming: RT Kernel
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Schedulability and Determinism
•SCHEDULABILITY - a property of a set of 
tasks ensuring that all tasks will meet their 
respective deadlines
•PREDICTABILITY - the property of meeting 
the temporal determinism criteria
•TEMPORAL DETERMINISM - the situation in 
which timing properties of the system are 
known (or bounded) for each set of inputs
Real-Time Programming: RT Kernel
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Topics important but not covered here:
• Real-Time Scheduling
„What Every Engineer Needs to Know about Rate-
Monotonic Scheduling”
IN: Advanced Multimicroprocessor Bus Architectures, 
IEEE Computer Society Press, 1995, pp. 321-335,
and Real-Time Magazine, Issue 1/95, pp. 6-24
• Device Drivers
„Teaching Device Drivers Technology in a Real-Time 
Systems Curriculum”
IN: Real-Time Systems Education III, IEEE Computer 
Society Press, 1999, pp. 42-48
and at http://www.wrs.com/univ/html/featurevol4.html
Real-Time Programming: RT Kernel
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Databus Safety
Databus Characteristics
 Mechanical properties concern bus wiring, 
connectors, their pinout, and module design and 
dimensions
 Electrical (or optical) properties are related to 
signal levels and their dynamics to carry 
information, including electromagnetic 
characteristics
 Logical properties concern the protocol of 
exchanging information over a bus
34
Page 63© 2005 by Andrew Kornecki and Janusz Zalewski
Databus Safety
Example of mechanical properties 
of the connector for FireWire bus.
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Databus Safety
Example of electrical properties of the PCI bus input 
signals (T_su – setup time, 7-12 ns; T_h – hold time).
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Databus Safety
Electrical interface between two FireWire nodes.
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Databus Safety
Example of electrical properties and low-level 
bus protocol for the PCI bus Read Transaction.
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Databus Safety
Example of logical properties of the bus for 
FireWire Asynchronous READ Transaction.
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Databus Safety
Specifics of the Bus Protocol:
• Bus arbitration
competing for bus access
• Data transfer
how devices exchange data once 
they obtain bus access
• Fault handling
dealing with bus errors
37
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Databus Safety
An Example of Modern Vehicle Network (Leen 2002)
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Databus Safety
Steer-by-Wire System (Waern 2003)
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Databus Safety
Distributed Flight Control System for Boeing 777 Aircraft
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Databus Safety
Distributed Flight Control System for JAS 
39 Gripen Aircraft (Johansson 2003)
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Databus Safety
Databus Type Architecture Medium Rate Encoding
Arinc 429 serial unidir. single master 2 wires 100kb/s RTZ bipolar
MIL1553 serial bi-dir. single master twist pairs 1 Mb/s biphase Manch.
Arinc 629 serial bi-dir. multi master twist pairs 2 Mb/s Manchester II
Arinc 659 serial bi-dir. quad redund twist pairs 30MHz biphase Manch.
FlexRay serial bi-dir. fault-tolerant optic/wire 10Mb/s undefined
CAN serial bi-dir. multi-master twist pairs 1 Mb/s NRZ + bit stuff
TTP/C serial bi-dir. dbl redund twist pairs 25Mb/s MFM
IEEE1394 serial d-chain/tree twist pairs 400Mb/s LVDS
Safe-Wire serial bi-dir. master-slave twist pairs 200 kb/s 3-level
SpaceWire serial bi-dir. master-slave 2 wires > 2Mb/s undefined
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Databus Safety
Risk Assessment Process
1) Multicriteria-based Safety 
Assessment
2) Hazard Analysis
3) Failure Mode Analysis
40
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Databus Safety
Criterion Selected Evaluation Factors
Safety Availability and reliability; Partitioning; Failure detection;
Common cause/mode failures; Bus expansion strategy;
Reconfigurability; Redundancy management
Data Integrity Maximum error rate; Error recovery; Load analysis;
Bus capacity; Security
Performance Operating speed; Schedulability of messages; System
interoperability; Bus length and max. load; Retry capability;
Bandwidth; Data latency; Transmission overheads
EMC Switching speed; Pulse rise and fall times; Wiring;
Shielding effectiveness; Lightning/radiation immunity
Design Assur. Compliance with standards (such as DO-254/DO-178B)
V&V Examples: functionality testing, system testing, failure
management, degraded mode operation
Configuration
Management
Examples: change control, compliance with standards,
documentation, interface control, system analysis, etc.
Continued
Airworthiness
Lifetime issues, such as physical degradation, in-service
modifications and repairs, impact analysis. (Rierson/Lewis, 2003)
Page 76© 2005 by Andrew Kornecki and Janusz Zalewski
Databus Safety
Failure Mode Description
Invalid Messages Messages sent across the bus
Contain invalid data
Non-Responsive An anticipated response to
a message does not occur or
return in time
Babbling Communication among nodes
Is blocked or interrupted by
uncontrolled data Stream
Conflict of Node Adrs More than one node has the same
identification (Debouk et al. , 2003)
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Databus Safety
Potential Hazard Possible Mitigation
Loss of Power Dual power system (including battery,
wires and connectors)
Loss of Communicat’n Dual communication system
Loss of Steering Backup system; Reduced functionality
Redundant system; Steer by braking
active safety system
Loss of Braking Backup system; Reduced functionality




Backup system; Reduced functionality
redundant system
Loss of Actuators Backup actuators; Red. performance actuator
Loss of Sensors
(recording driver cmds)
Backup sensors; Red. performance sensor
(Chau et al. , 2003)
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Databus Safety
Bus Experiments
• Plain simulation for well developed 
databus networked configurations
VME/Raceway
• Actual data transfer experiments with 
a modern bus FireWire
• Simulation and real experiments for 
routing in Bluetooth
• Improving Real-Time Characteristic 
of the Ethernet
42
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Databus Safety
Bus Parameters
• Bus response – access delay 
vs. bus load
• Bus throughput - data transfer 
rate vs. packet size
• Interconnect formation and 
routing
• Predictability of packet 
transmission time
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Databus Safety
Access delay vs. bus load:
When bus load increases, 
how does it impact access delay?
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Databus Safety
Server Access Delay for 64B Packets
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Databus Safety
Bus throughput:
When packet size increases,
how does it impact transfer rate?
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Databus Safety
IEEE 1394 Throughput over a Raw Driver 
for Asynchronous and Isochronous Modes
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Databus Safety
Interconnect formation and routing:
When nodes are being added,
how does it impact access delay 
and data transfer rate?
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Databus Safety
Bluetooth TCP Delay for Increasing Number of Nodes
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Databus Safety
Deterministic Ethernet:
Can Ethernet be made predictable
without modification of its CSMA/CD 
protocol?
Each node is assigned a priority and two flags:
- collision status flag, c_stat_flag
(collision resolution in progress)
- collision involved flag, c_inv_flag
(node was involved in the collision)
46
Page 87© 2005 by Andrew Kornecki and Janusz Zalewski
Databus Safety
Principle of a deterministic Ethernet protocol.
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Databus Safety
Behavior of a regular CSMA/CD node.
47
Page 89© 2005 by Andrew Kornecki and Janusz Zalewski
Databus Safety
Handling messages block of the protocol.
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Databus Safety
Comparison of packet transmission times for the 
classic CSMA/CD and the extended protocol.
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Databus Safety
Databus Safety
• New area with ongoing research
• Risk assessment methods 
essential as a starting point
• Definition of critical parameters 
• Experimentation needed
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Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity 
Indian Head, MD 
 
I. Introduction – Transforming Systems Safety Performance 
This introduction is for three related papers which require a similar background 
introduction. It is intended that the reader review this introduction before any of the 
attached papers: 
 Hooking into Systems Engineering 
 Systems Safety Engineering HR 
 Systems Safety in new Architecture and Technologies 
Likewise, the reader is spared the redundancy of re-reading the introduction in each paper 
by reading this header paper. 
 
II. Gap Analyses 
Nothing can be fixed without first investigating what is broken. 
The first issue at hand in any Gap Analysis is to determine exactly what focal point will 
be used to center the context.  “Begin with the end in mind”, Steven Covey in his 7 
Habits book, demands we consider what we want out of this gap analysis. 
We need first to find the definition of Systems Safety that we are trying to “save”. 
Systems Safety Engineering has had noble roots in Systems Engineering.  Over time, 
partly because of its success and partly because others could not defend their discipline 
nor find an established parent, Systems Safety Engineering has both endured law and 
regulation, de-standardization, and the various Lean 6 sigma and other process 
improvements.  Along the way, even inherited at least two disciplines. 
  
a. First gap is which Systems Safety? 
A review of MIL-STD-882D, DoD Standard Practice for Systems Safety, of 10FEB2000, 
reveals there are actually three parts: systems safety, occupational safety, and 
environmental safety. 
 
i. Three Safety Disciplines 
1. Systems Safety Engineering 
System Safety Engineering is an engineering science, derived from Systems Engineering, 
which is throughout the entire lifecycle of a program.  The practice involves risk 
assessments (better known as hazard assessments) from initial conceptual design, through 
implementation, test, release, and sustainment.  There are few college level engineering 
courses covering this expertise that extend beyond a few weeks in class. For a while it 
was possible to have experienced Systems Safety Engineers teach engineering new hires 
that discipline on-the-job, but with the need to increase billability per employee and 
cutbacks on resources combined with agile resourcing this is no longer possible.     
 
a. Software Systems Safety Engineering 
Software Systems Safety Engineering was added when the software was recognized to 
present a safety risk.  Rather than re-apply the existing Systems Safety Engineer to 
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comprehend and assess the increasing complexity and size, industry and government 
created this subset discipline.  An augmentation set of courses extended Systems Safety 
first.  Now technology is changing both Systems Safety and Software Safety.  An 
attached paper addresses this problem.  For a while it was possible to hire software and 
digital electronics engineers and have experienced Systems Safety Engineers teach them 
that discipline on-the-job, but with the need to increase billability per employee and 
cutbacks on resources combined with agile resourcing this is no longer possible.   
 
2. Occupational Health and Safety 
The safety of workers, military, and other humans was already covered by the Systems 
Safety approach but was not visible to management and did not appear complete to 
external reviewers.  It was also found that educational requirements were very different 
than the engineering-basis usually required for Systems safety, that is, they were more 
behavioral versus physics or software.  This led to a compromise, rather than re-train all 
the System Safety Engineers, a compliance-based approach was borrowed from 
successful OSHA programs and levied through the same MIL-STD-882 document.  The 
strength was the simplistic process.  The weakness that remained was that the military 
environment, or any site-specific environment for that matter, requires in-depth 
experiential knowledge that is difficult to train in the short timeframe (less than five to 
ten years). Therefore occupational safety was easier taught to ex-military than the other 
way around. Long term accomplishment was on-the-job training for new employees with 
experienced employees providing guidance and mentoring, but with the need to increase 
billability per employee and cutbacks on resources combined with agile resourcing this is 
no longer possible. 
 
3. Environmental Engineering and Safety 
The Environmental Safety requirement was added in manner similar to the OSHA-style 
in that it became necessary to make environmental compliance more visible.  Again MIL-
STD-882 was seen as an easy compromise document in which to add the requirement.  
Likewise again the education required was different and still again the experiential 
knowledge was so site-specific that even today the practitioners find it easier to take 
someone who has already worked in that area (flight-line, ship, sub, explosive ordnance 
disposal, rocket fuel plant) and then send them to the compliance-based classes rather 
than the other way around.  Indeed it is safer for the practitioner to have the field 
knowledge first (knows when to duck so to speak).  This is still an area where the 
Systems Safety Engineer is usually teamed with an Environmental Engineer or specialist 
rather than doing it alone. 
 
b. Second gap is getting connected (to Systems Engineering) 
Unlike Systems Safety Engineering, taking MIL-STD-882 as measurable response to a 
forcing function on that discipline, little has been done to incorporate software 
requirements and risk management into Systems Engineering.  There needs to be a 
holistic systems integration approach to the updating of Systems Engineering to re-
integrate Systems Safety Engineering, Systems Assurance and Security and, of course, 
Software Engineering.  Currently Programs move smartly through a Systems Hardware 
Critical Design Review (CDR) and yet software risks from the previous Preliminary 
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Design Reviews of hardware and software are not integrated into a meaningful combined 
or somehow dependent risk.  Several Program hardware systems have been found to 
ignore software altogether until System Integration or Test phase. There are currently 
efforts such as IEEE 15288, but it already lacks requirements and interface management 
sections as it goes to its latest revision.  The DoD has efforts in-work to update the 
Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) but it will be a year more before it is finished. 
 
c. Third gap is too connected (architecture) and too new (FPGA and  
technologies) 
As is pointed out in previous “upgrades” to MIL-STD-882 each added discipline required 
a change in the typical engineer’s abilities, education and experience.  The advancing 
technologies must be viewed in the same model.  When a (so-far) safe system is taken 
and simply attached to the internet for monitoring the safety risk changes, and changes in 
ways that are not obvious to the traditional Software Safety or Systems Safety Engineer.  
Just as Moore’s Law predicts the increase in microprocessor throughput, so also do the 
training and education requirements increase. 
Technology makes this time really different however.  This time the change is at both 
ends of size: both big and very small architecture.  At the big end, the global internet 
increases potential causes astronomically and simultaneously allows the safety critical 
functions to be physically spread throughout the system.  While at the small end an 
FPGA or ASIC now changes the ability to see or represent an electrical schematic and 
simultaneously allows the safety critical functions to be physically spread throughout the 
system.  These technologies are breaking the toolkit of most Systems safety and Software 
Safety Engineers.  Very few architectural-level and FPGA-level failure analyses are 
done, let alone available or understandable in a general engineering way.  Often the 
technology is proprietary.  The technologies are changing so fast that systems are being 
built right now without the updated training, education, or toolkit being available because 
neither the chip nor the interface existed at the project’s start. 
 
III. Change Evangelism 
Change is simple on paper but takes a dedicated evangelist in real life.  The evangelist 
must range wide and far and out-spoken everywhere. 
 
a. Systems Engineering 
i. Risk Management 
Systems Engineering must return to the roots of risk management and use that to 
maintain focus in prioritizing tasks in all schedules, meetings and budgets. 
 
ii. More Systems Stuff 
Like Systems Safety was made to absorb occupational and then environmental tasks, so 
also must Systems Engineering reconnect to its many children. All children must 
coordinate through and with Systems Engineering.  This can be done with the Systems 
Engineering Plan (SEP) and the Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) first. 
 
b. System Assurance 
i. Systems, Software, Information and Security 
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The architecture of the internet and changing world politics has coupled with technology 
to present new, diverse and complex problems for Security.  There was an IT discipline 
which attempts to make systems secure.  Information Systems Security Engineering 
(ISSE) is the art and science of discovering users' information protection needs and then 
designing and making information systems to safely resist the forces to which they may 
be subjected (their definition, and it includes “art”).  The dilemma is that most of the 
methods and techniques were applied before and after, and modifications are made at 
great cost.  The front-end bit is simplified to determining threats and defenses.  The 
center bit, called Engineering-in-Depth (Eid), is actually already performed by Systems 
Engineers, Software Engineers, Systems Safety and Software Safety Engineers.  The end 
bit, certification and accreditation, looks for “patterns” (similar to your virus detector) 
and dead code. 
The shortfalls in the IT and ISSE world are manifold: they are equally burdened by 
technology advancement, their best techniques are still manual, and they have few 
education and training opportunities or courseware that is specific to their domain or 
application.  IT is also not real-time and is often not safety-critical whereas a weapons 
system is both.  The natural progression then is to leverage the integration into Systems 
Engineering and to also leverage the Systems Safety and Software Safety requirements, 
analyses, and tests. 
 
c. End Game; initial state - get in front end 
i. Focus on Systems Safety Engineering (not occupational nor 
environmental) and strengthen the discipline 
ii. Follow Software Engineering integration with Systems 
Engineering efforts; 
iii. Courses in architecture and new technology failure analyses 
d. End Game; final state 
i. Guidebook for Engineers 
ii. S/W acquisition management Best Practices in Contract Language 
for integrated Systems/Software Engineering, Software 
Development Plan (SDP), Architectural views, new technology 
“locations” and functions 
iii. DAU and University courseware and degree programs 
iv. end to end across life-cycle, including sustainment and Intellectual 
Property (IP) rights. 
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1Transforming Systems Safety and 
Software Safety Today
for the Systems of Systems
of Tomorrow
Archibald “arch” McKinlay
Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA)
N32, Systems Software Safety Engineering
Indian Head, MD 20640-5151
Providing Ordnance Safety for our Warfighters
Ordnance Safety & Security Activity
2
First, what do I know?
Programs are getting “larger”
 Software size and complexity
 Number of people assigned
Systems Engineering is disconnected from 
Software Engineering
Processes not standard nor metric’ed
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) at “middle”






What in the Sw Systems Safety 
Tree am I Talking About?
Systems Sw Safety Engineering is not OSHA and not 






USC Title 29 & 42
USC Title 10












Why is achieving Minimum Safety Risk 
























RIGHT 1 RIGHT 1 Sys Eng
RIGHT 1 WRONG 0 Safety
WRONG 0 RIGHT 1 Safety
WRONG 0 WRONG 0 Safety
System Safety 
Engineering 
requires more time 
and resources 
because of the 
additional contexts 
to be considered.
Systems Engr. wants RIGHT Outcome at RIGHT time, but the 
RIGHT Outcome at the WRONG time can kill
(ComAir into trees example: RIGHT mode WRONG time)
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5How can we improve Systems and 
Software Engineering Partnerships?
– Defense Safety 
Oversight Council









• Primarily Focused on 
OSHA-type Safety (for 
example, auto accidents)
• Excuse to Bypass Processes
• Cost vs. Expertise
• Technology ahead of Analyses
• (same)
• (same)













DSB “Defense  
Software”
2000
Plenty of Direction closing 
in on Software Safety 
Defense Science Board 2000 
Report on Defense Software
 Need to improve processes
DoD Hon. Mr. Rumsfeld’s 
declaration Memo of Warfighter 
Safety, Accidents and Mishaps
 Reduce mishaps>thru Design!
ASN(RDA) Software Process 
Improvement
 focusing on CMMI equivalency
 No mention of Software Safety
OSD(AT&L) Software & Systems 
Engineering Initiative
 No mention of Software Safety
USD(AT&L) Memo solidifying 
























Sw & Systems 
Process 
Initiative 
<DATE?>Direction: “We can no longer consider safety as “nice to have””









7The Path we’re set upon
Mr. Krieg directing changes to DODI 5000.2, DODI 5600.72, and JCIDS 
Process (not strongly linked to contracts)
Mr. Schaeffer directing changes to make Joint reviews out of Service 
reviews (sphere of influence)
Dr Etter’s 5 Software Productivity Improvement Initiatives:
 System Software Engineering
New curriculum, USC, UMD
 Business Impacts
No or limited new resources
Limited training dollars available
Cannot hire/fire needed/finished skill
 Human Resources
Role-based/Right-fit
 Software Acquisition Management
IEEE 12207 as baseline
 No requirements management
 No endurance test
 No systems integration
 Software Development Techniques
8
Gap Analysis of the “As-Is”
Inconsistent compliance enforcement
Inconsistent software measurements and metrics
Independent Reviews are weak and unfocused
PEO/PM software process improvement…not 
happening
Contracting methods often counter-improvement
Lack of “bench” in systems software talent
“Bench” not layered for bigger programs
Providing Ordnance Safety for our Warfighters
















Gap Filling doesn’t reach the 
Engineer’s daily life!
The Short and Long term goals are too high a 
level for the working groups
Need to view gaps at the work flow level
Like other Architectures, more views and detail 
are required
Stakeholders are: PEO, PM, Chief Systems 
Engineer, Systems Safety Manager, Systems 
and Software Safety Engineers and Analysts




Support: System-level assurance achieved 
first
Ability: “Really big picture” but somehow 
with details always in mind
Training: Managing interfaces, many big 
and many small but with variable 
importance to the mission/safety
Experience: systems, systems integration, 
large numbers of complex interfaces
12
SoS Unique Issues
Agile work and workforce
 “live to work” alongside “work to live”
Multiple interfaces and description documents, some 
internal data flows too
 Some obvious and some buried details, but different amounts on 
every system in the SoS (tool to “see”, or experience?)
Multiple time domains
 Fourth dimensional complexity (course in timing variable?)
Multiple States & Modes
 Too many together (need tool or vision from training)
 Fifth dimension
Travel and online collaboration drives team composition 
to: communicator, admin, tech
 Need HR to screen or “bin” abilities for selection
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System Assurance (w/Anti-Tamper, etc.)
Software Engineering
PM – cost, schedule, risk management
Software Systems Safety Engineering
Software Configuration Management
Software Quality Assurance (SQA)














Critical Program Information (CPI)
Red lines/arrows are 































































































System Assurance (w/Anti-Tamper, etc.)
Software Engineering
PM – cost, schedule, risk management
Software Systems Safety Engineering
Software Configuration Management
Software Quality Assurance (SQA)







Red lines/arrows are 
































































































Threats & Tech IMPLIED by Mitigation
Systems Engineer 
and Risk Mgt Plan MDA PSR; SETR
16
Systems SW Engineer






Assoc. Deg (Sci.) or






PFSHW PM SW PM
NPS, USC, MIT, SEI 
Sys + SW Architecture, 
ultra-large systems
DAU, SW ACQ MGT






Principal-for-Safety (PFS) Certification Track
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• Systems of Systems Hazards
– Definition
– Types







3Systems of Systems Hazards

































Systems of Systems Hazards
• Systems of Systems Mishaps:
{SoS Mishaps} = Sum of {System Mishaps}
That is, the arrangement of systems into a SoS
does not introduce any new mishaps.
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5Systems of Systems Hazards
• Systems of Systems Hazards:
{SoS Hazards} ≠ Sum of {System Hazards}
That is, the arrangement of systems into a SoS
introduces new hazards.
Summary: The same mishaps exist, but there 
are new causes for them.
6
Systems of Systems Hazard 
Topology
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7Systems of Systems Hazards
An emergent hazard is any hazard that may 
occur within a system of systems that is not 
attributable to a single system.
A single system hazard is any hazard that 
may occur within a system of systems that is 
attributable to a single system and may occur 
whether or not that system is operating within 
the system of systems context.
8
Systems of Systems Hazards
An interface hazard is a hazard in which one 
system causes a mishap in another system 
by transferring a failure or partial performance 
over a defined interface, possibly through 
another system.
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9Systems of Systems Hazards
A proximity hazard is a hazard in one system 
that is caused by the operation, failure or 
partial performance of another system that is 
transferred to the victim system by a means 
other than a defined interface.
10
Systems of Systems Hazards
A resource hazard is a hazard that results from 




Systems of Systems Hazards
A reconfiguration hazard is a hazard that 
results from the transfer of a system of 
systems from one state to another.
12
Systems of Systems Hazards
An interoperability hazard is a hazard that 
occurs when the command, response or data 
of one system is interpreted by a second 
system in a manner that is inconsistent with 
the intent of the first system.
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13




• Documentation of the System Safety Process
• Identification of Hazards
• Assessment of Mishap Risk
• Identification of Mishap Risk Mitigation Measures
• Reduction of Mishap Risk to an Acceptable Level
• Verification of Mishap Risk Reduction
• Acceptance of Residual Mishap Risk
• Tracking of Hazards and Residual Mishap Risk
Systems of Systems cause problems for steps in red.
68
15
Interface Hazard Analysis Technique
16
Establish System List
• List all systems that may be part of the SoS, 
including:
– Systems that are always present,
– Systems that may be present, and
– Systems that are present sporadically.





Question: How does System A interface with 
System B?
a) 1 to 1
b) 1 to n
c) n to 1
d) m to n
18
System Model Development
• Steps for Developing a System Model:
– Identify System Mishaps
– Identify System Input failures that can lead to a 
system mishap or a system output failure
– Identify System Outputs that can fail as a result of 




Question: What mishaps can occur within a 
given system?
Hint: System Mishaps should have been identified 
within individual system hazard analyses
20
Input Analysis
Question: What is the effect on the system if an 
input fails in a certain manner?
Use guidewords (corrupt, incomplete, absent, etc) to assess the 
impact of an input failure (i.e. does it cause a mishap? Does it
cause an output to fail?)
Input + guideword = Input Failure > Mishap or Output
Are there combinations of failures that will lead to mishaps or 
output failures?





Question: What output failures can occur 
without the influence of another system?




• A system model is:
– A list of outputs that can fail and how they can fail
– A list of links from specific failed inputs to a 
mishap













• Function of Probability and Consequence:
– Consequence is the consequence of the mishap, 
which can be obtained from the relevant SHA
– Probability is the combination of the probabilities 
of the hazard events (i.e. output failures, links from 
inputs to outputs and links from inputs to mishaps)
Each one has a probability of occurrence
Input Failure causing a MishapInput Failure causing 
an Output Failure
































– Hazards within system models but not identified 
by search
– Hazards left out of system models
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Residual Risk - Example
• For example, using the average probability 
combination:
– Highest Probability with three elements:
• Frequent x Frequent x Frequent = Occasional
– Highest Probability with four elements:
• Frequent x Frequent x Frequent x Frequent = Remote
• If residual risk needs to have all hazard probabilities 
at remote or below, then all combinations of three 
elements must be assessed.
• The maximum allowable hazard probability will 
depend upon the acceptable priority threshold, the 
method for combining probabilities and 
consequences, and the highest consequence.
30
Accommodate New Systems
• SoS will have new systems added over time
• The interface hazard analysis technique must easily 
accommodate this
• Process above can do this because:
– It is automated, hazards can be generated quickly once data 
is known. Combinations are not explored by hand.
– System models are independent of the surrounding systems 
(i.e. failed inputs are linked to mishaps whether or not that 
failure can occur, it might not be possible currently, but may 




• Allows the user to enter system model data
• Searches the model data for SoS hazards
• Is not meant to be used, just to demonstrate 
that the process can be easily implemented.
• Not complete:
– Network analysis algorithm is simplified
– Does not accommodate common mode failures
• So far:
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Abstract- In recent years, the software safety 
community has more examples of successful 
experience with producing high-confidence 
software than does the software security 
community. The safety community’s experience 
provides lessons for software security 
practitioners, but as usually approached the 
engineering safety problem differs from the 
security one in a critical way – it presumes non-
existence of maliciousness and thereby the 
appropriateness of probabilistic analysis. The 
existence of maliciousness and security 
weaknesses could lead to the similar adverse 
consequences as those usually addressed in safety 
engineering meaning “safety” cannot be provided 
unless security is addressed. 
 
I. SAFETY AND SECURITY 
Today, security is a concern for most systems as 
software has become central to the functioning of 
organizations and physical systems with much of it 
is directly or indirectly exposed to the Internet or to 
insider attack as well as to subversion during 
development, deployment, and updating. Though 
safety-oriented systems so exposed now must also 
face the security problem, often traditional 
computing safety engineering does not address 
maliciousness and its perverse effect on 
probabilistic analyses.1 [9] 
This engineering analysis technique issue may 
be operationally more significant than whether 
something is labeled a safety or a security concern 
as, in practice, what is labeled what (including 
neither) is not strictly a function of maliciousness, 
type or size of adverse consequence, illegitimacy, or 
even the existence of a criminal penalty. 
                                                 
1 However, physical and operational safety have recognized 
closely related security concerns, for example the time needed 
to break into a nuclear plant. 
 
II. PROBABILITY VERSUS POSSIBILITY 
The patterns of occurrences of “natural” events 
relevant to safety are described probabilistically for 
engineering purposes. The probability of a natural 
event contrasts with the need for concern for the 
possibility of an intelligent, malicious action. For 
example, a standard tactic in conflicts is to attack 
where and when the opponent least expects it – that 
is where the defender has assigned the lowest 
probability or risk. This distinction is central to the 
difference between facing safety hazards versus 
security threats (threatening entities, conditions, 
events, and consequences). [9] 
 
III. COMBINING SAFETY AND SECURITY 
One can write requirements for safety and 
security that look quite similar in form.[1]  Here is a 
highly abstract and condensed example that shows 
elements of this commonality. 
• The system shall have  
– limited adverse consequences  
– limited related uncertainty  
• The combined effect of these shall provide basis 
for an engineering conclusion that system will 
meet, is adequately progressing toward meeting, 
or has met its requirements or claims regarding 
risk and consequences criteria and objectives  
• These claims and the valid arguments with 
supporting evidence, which justify them, shall 
be documented and reviewed in a well-
organized, defensible, and auditable “Assurance 
Case.”  
• This Assurance Case shall provide adequate 
grounds  for stakeholders’ acceptable 
confidence and rationally justified decisions  
• The assurance case shall  
– Identify system’s environments and 
conditions throughout its lifespan; and 
capabilities, acts, events, and conditions 
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within the system and its environments 
that may threaten or damage the system 
or the interests of relevant stakeholders.   
– Be planned, developed, and managed 
concurrently and integrally with the 
system, and maintained throughout the 
lifespan of the system.   
– Make verifiable claims supported by 
thorough, robust arguments and valid 
evidence of adequate quality and known 
relevance and meaningfulness and 
include any contraindicating arguments 
and evidence.  
– Be planned, developed, and maintained 
using suitable, integrated 
system/software processes, resources 
and means, environment, management, 
and time of quantity and quality shown 
to be sufficient for achieving claims and 
ensure validity 
When both safety and security are required, a 
number of areas are candidates for partially 
combining safety and security engineering concerns 
including: 
• Goals or claims including sub-goals or sub-
claims, 
• Constraints on system behavior, 
• Principles, 
• Solutions, 
• Activities and processes, 
• Assurance case: 
o Goals/claims, 
o Assurance arguments, 
o Evidence, 
• Correctness 
• Evaluations and certifications.  
Many people have pointed out commonalities. 
[2] [7] [8]  The SafSec effort provides guidance on 
one way to do this at least for assurance cases [5] 
[6]. 
In recent years, the software safety community 
has been more advanced in its thinking, for example 
[3] [4], and has more examples of successful 
experience with producing high-confidence 
software than does the software security 
community. The safety community’s experience 
provides lessons for software security practitioners, 
but the traditional engineering safety problem 
differs from the security one in a critical way – it 
presumes non-existence of maliciousness. 
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Safety and Security
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Topics
Some Commonalities regarding Danger
Traditional Security and Safety
Using Probability?
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Some Commonalities 
regarding Danger
Concern for Danger and 
Damage make Safety and 
Security Bedfellows
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Desirable Characteristics of 




Capacity, throughput, and speed






Contracts, laws and regulations, and policy
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Duality of Events and Conditions
Bad Events to eliminate, 







Actions needed to 
prevent, avoid, …
respond to bad actions 
and events




Asset properties (e.g. 
Confidentiality, 
Integrity, Availability)
System states that are 
not preconditions for 
act
Ability to establish and 
maintain capability
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Examples
Bad Event Good Condition
Always True






All human operators properly trained
All commands allowed  to go to  reactor are 
predicted to be benign
Computing 
Assets
Table of limits or 
History data corrupted
Table of limits changed only by authorized 




outside or asset is not 
logged
Every operation involving an asset has 





Required functionality is available, correct, 
and tamper proof (and also needs to be not 
bypassable)
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Specifications
Behavior (e.g. Functionality)





For example, constraints in forms of:
Allow only authorized authorities to order reactor startup
Never allow anyone but good guys to change sensitive data
Security functionality is not bypassable
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Attacks, Mistakes, and 










Change of ControlChange of Control
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Summary
Safety and security share much in common
Ultimately about adverse consequences and 
their uncertainty
Duality of avoiding bad events and preserving 
good conditions
Bad events cause, allow, facilitate, or contribute to 
adverse consequence 
Avoid preconditions for bad events 
System in danger all its life
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Behavior can be result of outside entity or inherent 
behavior of system or software.
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Security Properties – CIA+
Confidentiality: preventing unauthorized 
disclosure
Integrity: preventing unauthorized alteration 
Availability: preventing unauthorized destruction 
or denial of access or service
Accountability: knowing what entity did what when
Non-repudiation: ensuring the inability to deny the 
ownership of prior actions
Identification: known identities needed for entities as much of security is 
about who can do what when 
Authentication: verifying identity ensuring entity identified correctly
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Maliciousness
Existence of maliciousness does not make non-
malicious problems go away
Performing to specification
Not probabilistic reliability and availability
Adversaries often attack where least expected
Anything could happen
Adversary wants best thing for her/himself – may 
include wanting to make the worst possible thing 
happen to you at the worst time
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Using Probability
Can malicious behavior be validly modeled 
probabilistically?
Reasonably frequent similar malicious behavior 
generally can be modeled probabilistically. E.g. 
car theft, household burglaries, script kiddies
However, serious adversaries tend to, “Attack 
where, when, and how their opponent least 
expects”
That is, where probability is judged to be low
Result of Murphy’s law happens not evidently but deliberately 
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Other uncertainty-based formal systems of reasoning
– E.g. worst case, fuzzy sets, others used in AI
Qualitative
E.g. staff skill and experience, compliance with 
standard, qualitative statements of event causality
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Summary





But ultimately it is about adverse consequences and 
their uncertainty
A common way to think about security-related 
software behavior is with constraints
Probability-based analysis may not work for 
maliciousness
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Shared Abstract Requirement - 1
The system shall have 
limited adverse consequences 
limited related uncertainty 
Together these shall provide a basis for an 
engineering conclusion that system meets its 
requirements or claims regarding criteria and 
objectives related to risk and consequences
meets = will meet, is adequately progressing toward 
meeting, or has met – depending on time
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Shared Abstract Requirement - 2
These claims and the valid arguments with supporting 
evidence, which justify them, shall be documented and 
reviewed in a well-organized, defensible, and auditable 
“Assurance Case.”
This Assurance Case shall provide adequate grounds  for 
stakeholders’ acceptable confidence and rationally 
justified decisions
System (including assurance case) shall be planned, 
developed, and maintained in a manner sufficient for 
achieving claims and ensuring adequacy and validity of 
assurance case
using suitable, integrated system/software processes, resources and 
means, environment, management, and time shown to be sufficient 
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Shared Abstract Requirement
The assurance case shall 
Identify what may threaten or damage the system or 
the interests of relevant stakeholders
within system’s environments and conditions throughout its 
lifespan; and for all capabilities, acts, events, and modes  
Be planned, developed, and managed concurrently 
and integrally with the system, and maintained 
throughout the lifespan of the system.  
Make verifiable claims supported by 
thorough, robust arguments 
valid evidence of adequate quality and known relevance and 
meaningfulness 
– include any contraindicating arguments and evidence, and 
– having limited assumptions (non-critical, weak) 
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Candidates Concerns for Partially 
Combining Safety and Security
Goals or claims including sub-goals or sub-claims
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In Closing
Abstractly and in practice safety and 
security have similarities
Maliciousness is hard to totally discount 
anywhere and can make probabilities 
unknowable/unsuitable
An important question in engineering 
practice is when a probabilistic approach is 
appropriate
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Some Terms for Bad Things
Specification fault
Violations of specification
Violation coming from outside 
Mistake, accident, mishap, 
act of nature, subversion, 
penetration, or attack
Violation in static 
representation of system
Fault, vulnerability (or more 
casually “defect”)
Violation of constraints on 
dynamic system state
Error
Violation from inside crossing 
system boundary – visible 
outside
Failure
Result – inside or outside 
system











Propensity toward Bad Things
Weakness, bad practice, 
error prone, failure prone
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The Navy currently has no formal certification for Safety Engineers concentrating in software safety.  
NOSSA has led an effort to educate personnel regarding the development and support of Naval Weapon 
Systems.  The WISE training tool is a step in the right direction, but further formal training is needed to 
support experience in software safety.  There is a need to evade the case of untrained software safety 
engineers that are arbitrarily appointed tasks. This should not be based on education or experience alone but 
rather a combination of experience, education, and certification.  A documented certification process will 
only improve systems required to be safe that depend on software.  This document provides several options 
to obtain a solid software and systems safety background for Navy applications. 
 
Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity  
 
The Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) is a field activity of the Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA).  NOSSA manages all aspects of the Department of the Navy (DoN) Explosives 
Safety Program.  As the NAVSEA technical authority for Explosives Safety, NOSSA is responsible for 
providing technical policies, procedures and design criteria associated with weapons systems safety, 
including software safety across the warfare disciplines.  NOSSA manages all programmatic policy 
requirements for the five major DoN Explosives Safety Program component programs; Ordnance Safety 
and Security, Weapons and Combat System Safety, Ordnance Environmental Support Office, Insensitive 
Munitions Office, and Weapons and Ordnance Quality Evaluation.1 
 
NOSSA Certification and Training 
 
The NOSSA objective for certification and training is to establish a reasonable and recognizable assurance 
of the system safety competencies necessary in managing today’s complex systems and Research, 
Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts.  The ultimate goals of NOSSA’s certification process 
are to promote those qualitative characteristics required of Naval and support contractor personnel engaged 
in system safety practices, and to enhance the system safety engineering processes within existing and 
future Navy acquisition programs.  In complying with current requirements, it is critical that a process is 
established by which personnel qualifications and training can be measured and confirmed.  
 
WISE Online Training 
 
The Weapon System Explosives Safety Review Board (WSESRB) Interactive Safety Environment (WISE) 
training program provides the medium for achieving Principal for Safety (PFS) certification.  Through a 
series of testable modules, a potential candidate can gain access to the body of knowledge required to 
perform as an effective PFS for DoN Programs.2 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.nossa.navsea.navy.mil/ 
 
2 NOSSA secure website 
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Software Safety Handbook 
 
In 1999, the Joint Software System Safety (SSS) Committee developed a handbook to provide management 
and engineering guidelines to achieve a reasonable level of assurance that the software will execute within 
the system context with an acceptable level of safety risk.  The handbook is both a reference document and 
management tool for aiding managers and engineers at all levels, in any government or industrial 
organization.  It demonstrates “how to” in the development and implementation of an effective SSS process.  
This process minimizes the likelihood or severity of system hazards caused by poorly specified, designed, 
developed, or operation of software in safety-critical applications.3 
 
GRADUATE LEVEL PROGRAMS 
 
There are a number of graduate level courses and programs offered in system safety.  These include the 
University of Southern California (USC), Embry Riddle University, the University of York, Texas A&M, 
and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).  MIT has a program that concentrates on software 
engineering (SERL, or Software Engineering Research Laboratories). 
 
University of Southern California 
 
The USC Viterbi School of Engineering provides a four day course in software safety in addition to a two 
week course in systems engineering.  These courses support certification in USC Aviation Safety and 
Security.4 
 
The Software Safety course presents philosophies and methods of developing and analyzing software and 
highlights managing a software safety program.  Software design principles are taught to create programs 
that are fault tolerant and acceptably safe.  Several software hazard analyses methods are evaluated, 
including Fault Tree/Soft Tree, Software Sneak Analysis and Petri Nets.  The course objective is to provide 
an understanding of the nature of software hazards, root causes, and the methods by which these hazards 
may be prevented or discovered.  The course also provides instruction using administrative methods and 
documentation needed to establish and manage a software safety program.  Providing evidence for a safety 
case or proof is also covered.  This course is designed for systems managers and engineers, systems safety 
engineers and software engineers who are involved with developing systems that possess major software 
components and are responsible for the safety.  Recommendations for preparation for this course include 
attending the System Safety Engineering course and some understanding of software.5 
 
Embry Riddle University 
 
Embry Riddle University doesn’t offer a specific software safety course, but it does have a Bachelor of 
Science and Master of Science degree in Safety Science. The Bachelor of Science degree is taught at the 
Daytona Beach campus.6  The Master of Science degree is taught at the Prescott, AZ campus.7  Both the 
Bachelor and Master degree concentrate on the aeronautical field. 
 
The University of York 
 
                                                 
3 Software System Safety Handbook, A Technical & Managerial Team Approach, Joint Services Computer 












The University of York provides a Systems Safety Engineering (SSE) Certificate two year course. The Two 
year course has six modules. Each module is taught full time in York for one week. Its associated assessed 
exercise, which may be completed on or off site, takes approximately 35 hours in addition. All assessed 
exercises are open, comprising a report, case study, or documented piece of software.8  
 
NPS Monterey – Weapons System Software Safety 
 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey offers a weapons system software safety course, a requirement for 
a master’s degree in Systems Engineering.  SW45829 provides the foundation for Software Systems Safety.  
The course focuses heavily on the Software Engineering aspects of the discipline; the content injects 
enough Systems Safety Engineering principles to ensure that the graduates fully understand their 
responsibility in the overall system development process. 
 
University of Washington 
 
The University of Washington College of Engineering periodically offers software systems safety courses, 
in addition to system safety management and reliability analysis. The software systems safety course is a 
five day course that provides the knowledge needed to implement a practical software safety effort for 
maximum impact on design and test activities. 10 
 
SYMPOSIUMS AND CONFERENCES 
 
The International System Safety Conference (ISSC) is held annually during the summer.  The Joint 
Weapon System Safety Conference (JWSSC) is held in conjunction with the ISSC.  The 2007 
ISSC/JWSSC is scheduled August 13-17 in Baltimore, MD.11 
 
The newly created Technical Committee on System Safety under the IEEE System Society is holding a 
series of annual international workshops on issues relating to safety of systems of national and global 
significance.  The first event is being held in March 2007 at the Naval Postgraduate School.12 
 
The IEEE International Symposium on Dependable Autonomic and Secure Computing (DASC) is held 
annually.  The 2007 Symposium is scheduled for Sept 25-27, 2007 at Loyola College Graduate Center, 
Columbia, MD. 
 
The International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, or SAFECOMP, is an annual 
event covering the state-of-the-art, experience and new trends in the areas of computer safety, reliability 
and security regarding dependable application of computer systems. SAFECOMP provides ample 
opportunity to exchange insights and experience on emerging methods and practical application across the 
borders of different disciplines. The 2007 SAFECOM is scheduled for Sept 18-21, 2007 in Nuremburg, 
Germany.13 
 
Safeware© System Safety for Software-Intensive Systems 
 















Safeware Corporation offers a one week class covering fundamental concepts and techniques in building 
and ensuring safety, with particular emphasis on those aspects of complex systems not handled well by 
traditional system safety approaches, such as software and human-computer interaction. 14 
 
DAU Online Training 
 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) offers the Systems Safety for Systems Engineers course (CLE009). 
This is an online 3.5 hour course module which shows how the MIL-STD-882D methodology is integrated 
into the Department of Defense systems engineering process for eliminating environment, safety, and 
occupational health hazards or minimizing the associated risk.  It uses the systems engineering V-model to 




Several options for safety certification are available.  These include Certified Safety Professional 
Certification, PFS certification by NOSSA, and Certified Functional Safety Expert (CFSE) certification. 
 
Certified Safety Professional 
 
The Board of Certified Safety Professionals (BCSP) provides certification in safety which combines 
education, experience and a certified exam.15 
 
PFS Certification and Designation by NOSSA 
 
A PFS is recognized as certified to perform associated system safety managerial duties only upon 
successful completion of the certification process outlined in NOSSAINST 12410.5.  A PFS certification 
provides a quantified and recognizable assurance of system safety competencies to program management.  
While PFS Certification is a professional mark of distinction, it is not, and shall not be used as, an 
employment designation. 
 
Certification as a PFS should not be confused with designation as a PFS.  The designation as an Acquisition 
Programs PFS is a formally delegated authority, as required by OPNAVINST 5100.24A, given in writing 
by the acquisition program’s management.  The Acquisition Program PFS is both the technical authority 
regarding matters of system safety, and the professional conduit into the system safety body of knowledge, 
the system safety community, and the acquisitions lifecycle. 
 
NOSSA has defined a certification path for PFS at three levels.  The three PFS Certification categories 
available are PFS High, Medium, and Low Certification. 
 
Certified Functional Safety Expert Governance Board 
 
The CFSE governance board was formed to improve the skills and formally establish the competency of 
those engaged in the practice of safety system application in process and manufacturing industries.  The 
CFSE board offers exams which provide two levels of certification, a CFSE and CFSP.  Prospective 
members can select a specialization, which includes Process Industry Safety, Machinery Safety, Safety 
Hardware Development, and Safety Software Development.  In order to qualify to take the tests, candidates 
must have at least ten years experience in safety, but are given years credit for level of education. 16 
 
                                                 
14 http://www.safeware-eng.com/services/training.htm 
 








This position paper was written to identify the options available to obtain system safety training, 
specifically in the Software Safety field.  Formalized training is important, which provides a good 
foundation for software safety.  In addition to training, certified software safety engineers should also have 
a mentor assigned, attend a safety board presentations to gain experience, and also provide a report of 
training experiences.  Listed are recommendations to create better software safety engineers: 
 
1. The WISE training tool must be required for software safety engineers. This system would 
document the Navy specific training.  
2. The DAU system safety modules may be duplicate information, but software safety engineers 
should also be required to take all available safety courses offered.  These applications are offered 
at the Department of Defense level.  It is the hope that the DAU online and site coursework will be 
expanded in the safety field. 
3. At least six hours of accredited course work from a post graduate program should be required.  
4. A mentor assignment should be required for software safety engineers.  It is important to obtain a 
mentor within the systems safety community to share experiences, knowledge and wisdom about 
safety, and to guide and assist less experienced safety personnel.  The mentor can also provide 
training opportunities, in addition to sharing experiences that would specifically benefit a person 
desiring to broaden their knowledge in systems and software safety.  A mentor/student 
relationship is instrumental in developing effective safety engineers. 
5. Periodic attendance to safety related symposiums and conferences should be required.  This gives 
the software safety engineer the opportunity to keep current with safety issues and solutions 
available. 
6. Participation on SSSTRP and WSESRB should be required.  Before software certification is 
granted, it is invaluable experience to participate or attend as a guest of the SSSTRP and 
WSESRB.  The participation should include a related and non related system, to give the software 
safety engineer broader experience to systems outside his experience. 
7. A safety engineer should be required to perform, or assist in preparing a software safety analysis 
to gain hands on experience.  
8. The safety engineer should be required to provide an informal exit presentation or report of his 
training experiences.  This will be valuable feedback to provide better future training experiences.  
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Competency Software Safety 
Requirements for Navy 
Engineers




• US Navy currently has no formal engineering 
Software Safety certification process
• Software Safety engineers are often appointed 
based on either availability, experience, or 
education alone
• Certifications, training tools, courses, and 
workshops are available from various sources
• A documented quantitative certification process 




• Naval Ordinance Safety and Security 
Activity is a field activity for NAVSEA
• NOSSA manages all aspects of the Navy’s 
Explosives Safety Program
– Ordinance Safety and Security
– Weapons and Combat System Safety
– Ordinance Environmental Support Office
– Insensitive Munitions Office
– Weapons and Ordinance Quality Evaluation
NOSSA Certification
• Promotes qualitative characteristics 
required by Safety personnel
• Enhances System Safety within the 
Systems Engineering Process for Navy 
acquisition programs
• In complying with these requirements, it is 
critical that a quantitative process is 
established
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PFS and PFS Certification
• Principal for Safety (PFS) Certification is 
obtained via the Weapons System 
Explosives Safety Review Board 
(WSESRB) Interactive Safety Environment 
(WISE) online training and is not used as 
an employment designation
• A PFS is appointed for each DoN 
acquisition program by program 
management
Other Certifications
• The Board of Certified Safety 
Professionals (BCSP) provides 
certification combining education 
experience and examinations
• The Certified Functional Safety Expert 
Governance Board provides certification 
based on tests
– Minimum of 10 years of experience in safety 
is required to take certification exam but years 
of credit can be given for level of education
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Graduate Level Programs
• University of Southern California – 4 day 
course in Software Safety
• Naval Postgraduate School – 3 credit hour 
Weapon System Software Safety course
• Massachusetts Institute of Technology –
Software Engineering Research 
Laboratories program
• Texas A&M – Systems Safety Program
Symposiums & Conferences
• International System Safety Conference (ISSC) / 
Joint Weapons Systems Safety Conference 
(JWSSC) are held annually
– 07 session is August 13-17 in Baltimore, MD
• IEEE International Workshop on System Safety
• IEEE International Symposium on Dependable 
Automatic and Secure Computing (DASC) is 
held annually
– 07 session is September 25-27 in Columbia, MD
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Other Training
• Safeware® System Safety for Software 
Intensive Systems – 1 week class
• Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
online training for Systems Safety for 
Systems Engineering
Recommendations for DoN Safety 
Engineers
• Require the WISE training tool for Navy 
specific training
• DAU system safety modules should be 
taken along with any other available safety 
courses
• Minimum of 6 hours of accredited 
coursework for Software Safety
• Periodic attendance to Safety related 
symposiums and conferences
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Recommendations for DoN Safety 
Engineers (cont)
• A mentor assignment should be required for new 
safety engineers to share experience, provide 
guidance and promote training opportunities
• Participation on Software System Safety 
Technical Review Panel (SSSTRP) and 
WSESRB should be required
• Participation in a software safety analysis for 
hands-on experience
• Engineer should provide an informal exit 
presentation or report of training experiences to 
provide feedback needed to continuously 
improve process
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Abstract. Biologically-inspired autonomous and autonomic systems (AAS) are essentially 
concerned with creating self-directed and self-managing systems based on metaphors from 
nature and the human body, such as the autonomic nervous system.  Agent technologies have 
been identified as a key enabler for engineering autonomy and autonomicity in systems, both 
in terms of retrofitting into legacy systems and in designing new systems.  Handing over 
responsibility to systems themselves raises concerns for humans with regard to safety and 
security.  This paper reports on the continued investigation into a strand of research on how to 
engineer self-protection mechanisms into systems to assist in encouraging confidence 
regarding security when utilizing autonomy and autonomicity. This includes utilizing the 
apoptosis and quiescence metaphors to potentially provide a self-destruct or self-sleep signal 
between autonomic agents when needed, and an ALice signal to facilitate self-identification 
and self-certification between anonymous autonomous agents and systems. 
1. Introduction 
The field of Biology changed dramatically in 1953, with the determination by 
Francis Crick and James Dewey Watson of the double helix structure of DNA.    
This discovery changed Biology for ever, allowing the sequencing of the human 
genome, and the emergence of a “new Biology” focused on DNA, genes, proteins, 
data, and search.   Computational Biology and Bioinformatics heavily rely on 
computing to facilitate research into life and development. 
Simultaneously, an understanding of the biology of living organisms indicates a 
parallel with computing systems: molecules in living cells interact, grow, and 
transform according to the “program” dictated by DNA. 
Moreover, paradigms of Computing are emerging based on modeling and 
developing computer-based systems exploiting ideas that are observed in nature.    
This includes building self-management and self-governance mechanisms that are 
inspired by the human body’s autonomic nervous system into computer systems, 
modeling evolutionary systems analogous to colonies of ants or other insects, and 
developing highly-efficient and highly-complex distributed systems from large 
numbers of (often quite simple) largely homogeneous components to reflect the 
behaviour of flocks of birds, swarms of bees, herds of animals, or schools of fish. 
This new field of “Biologically-Inspired Computing”, often known in other 
incarnations by other names, such as: Autonomic Computing, Pervasive Computing, 
Organic Computing, Biomimetics, and Artificial Life, amongst others, is poised at 
the intersection of Computer Science, Engineering, Mathematics, and the Life 
Sciences.    Successes have been reported in the fields of drug discovery, data 
communications, computer animation, control and command, exploration systems 
for space, undersea, and harsh environments, to name but a few, and augur much 
promise for future progress. 
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2. Safety and Security in Biologically-Inspired Systems 
It is often joked that researchers in the security domain view safety as being a 
subset of security, while researchers in the safety domain see security as being a 
special case of safety.   In fact, there is a certain degree of truth in both views, and 
valid cases can be made to support either position. 
It is certainly true that various techniques from reliability engineering, safety 
engineering, and related areas, can be adapted to address issues in security.  
Similarly, protocols, analysis mechanisms, and other techniques from the security 
domain have been demonstrated to have useful application in safety-critical systems. 
The classes of system that we’re concerned with in this paper have their own 
particular issues vis-à-vis security and safety, however.   Such systems are evolving, 
and adapting to the circumstances in their environment.  More importantly, these 
systems are self-directed — we cannot necessarily tell a priori what situations they 
will be expected to address, nor necessarily what actions they will take to address 
them.  
The FAST (Formal Approaches to Swarm Technologies) project looked at 
deriving a formal development method for swarm-based systems, a particular class 
of biologically-inspired system where (usually) a large number of components 
(whether software or physical devices) collaborate to achieve a common goal [22, 
23].  As its example “test-bed”, FAST used the ANTS (Autonomous Nano-
Technology Swarm) concept mission, described in more detail in Section 4. 
The project found (unsurprisingly) that no single formal development notation 
was sufficient to address all of the issues (in the case of ANTS, these were primarily 
safety-related issues, although security is not entirely discounted and likely to be a 
more important issue in actual operation).   Moreover, it found that a realistic formal 
approach would require the use of a notation that made some allowance for the 
expression of probabilities and frequencies of operations.  To this end, the FAST 
project proposed the combination of several formal notations, one of which is a 
probabilistic variant of a popular process algebra.   The interested reader is directed 
to [26] for further details. 
Further investigation, however, highlighted the fact that most of these 
probabilities and frequencies would be little more than guesswork, with a lot of the 
probabilities being so tiny (unlikely) that their combination would result in so many 
combinations of operations for which the probably was so close to zero that they 
couldn’t be distinguished.   We believe that this is likely to be the case with other 
types of biologically-inspired systems also.   We simply do not have the experience 
to realistically estimate probabilities, nor are we ever likely to, since such systems 
are expected to “learn” and improve their operation over time. 
As a result, any approach to the development of such systems (whether formal or 
otherwise) will be limited.   That is not to say that there are not benefits from the use 
of formal approaches.  In fact, FAST demonstrates that properties (safety properties, 
security properties, and others) may be proposed and proven to hold (or otherwise), 
giving certain degrees of assurance as to how the system will operate under certain 
conditions.   Such an approach also allows for a significant amount of “what-if” 
analysis, where conditions can be formulated and in many cases it can be 
demonstrated that the system will be able to avoid, or if necessary, recover from, 
these conditions.    
The reality, however, is that we cannot possibly foresee all such conditions and 
eventualities, and biologically-inspired systems must, as a consequence, have a 
greater number of prevention mechanisms built in, in order to ensure correct, safe, 
and secure operation. 
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 3. Biologically-Inspired Computing Concepts 
 
Figure 1 Autonomic and Autonomous Computing Environment 
3.1 Autonomic Computing and Agents 
Autonomic Computing is dependent on many disciplines for its success; not least of 
these is research in agent technologies.  At this stage, there are no assumptions that 
agents have to be used in an autonomic architecture, but as in complex systems there 
are arguments for designing the system with agents [1], as well as providing inbuilt 
redundancy and greater robustness [2], through to retrofitting legacy systems with 
autonomic capabilities that may benefit from an agent approach [3] to research 
depicting the autonomic manager as an agent itself, for instance, a self-managing cell 
(SMC) [4], containing functionality for measurement and event correlation and 
support for policy-based control. 
Figure 1 represents a view of an architecture for self-managing systems, where an 
autonomic element consists of the component required to be managed, and the 
autonomic manager [10].  It is assumed that an autonomic manager (AM) is 
responsible for a managed component (MC) within a self-contained autonomic 
element (AE). This autonomic manager may be designed as part of the component or 
provided externally to the component, as an agent, for instance.  Interaction will 
occur with remote autonomic managers (cf. the autonomic communications channel 
shown in Figure 1) through virtual, peer-to-peer, client-server or grid configurations. 
The figure depicts self-* event messages as well as mobile agents, which assist with 
self-managing activity, traveling along this channel. 
Essentially, the aim of autonomic computing is to create robust dependable self-
managing systems [5].  To facilitate this aim, fault-tolerant mechanisms such as a 
heart-beat monitor (‘I am alive’ signals) and pulse monitor (urgency/reflex signals) 
may be included within the autonomic element [6, 7].  The notion behind the pulse 
monitor (PBM) is to provide an early warning of an undesirable condition so that 
preparations can be made to handle the processing load of diagnosis and planning a 
response, including diversion of load.  Together with other forms of communications 
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it creates dynamics of autonomic responses [8] – the introduction of multiple loops 
of control, some slow and precise, others fast and possibly imprecise, fitting with the 
biological metaphors of reflex and healing [6]. 
3.2 Biological Apoptosis 
The biological analogy of autonomic systems has been well discussed in the 
literature.  While reading this, the reader is not consciously concerned with their 
breathing rate or how fast their heart is beating.  Achieving the development of a 
computer system that can self-manage without the conscious effort of the user is the 
overarching vision of the Autonomic Computing initiative [9].  Another typical 
biological example is that the touching of a sharp knife results in a reflex reaction to 
reconfigure the area in danger to a state that is no longer in danger (self-protection, 
self-configuration, and, if damage has occurred, self-healing) [10]. 
If you cut yourself and it starts bleeding, you will treat it and carry on with your 
tasks without any further conscious thought.   Yet, often, the cut will have caused 
skin cells to be displaced down into muscle tissue [11].  If they survive and divide, 
they have the potential to grow into a tumor.  The body’s solution to dealing with 
this situation is cell self-destruction.  There is mounting evidence that some forms of 
cancer are the result of cells not dying fast enough, rather than multiplying out of 
control. 
It is believed that a cell knows when to commit suicide because cells are 
programmed to do so – self-destruct (sD) is an intrinsic property.  This self-
destruction is delayed due to the continuous receipt of biochemical reprieves.  This 
process is referred to as apoptosis [12], meaning “drop out”, and was used by the 
Greeks to refer to the Autumn dropping of leaves from trees; i.e., loss of cells that 
ought to die in the midst of the living structure.  The process has also been 
nicknamed “death by default” [13], where cells are prevented from putting an end to 
themselves due to constant receipt of biochemical “stay alive” signals.  
Further investigations into the apoptosis process [14] have uncovered more details 
about this self-destruct predisposition.  Whenever a cell divides, it simultaneously 
receives orders to kill itself.  Without a reprieve signal, the cell does indeed self-
destruct.   It is believed that the reason for this is self-protection, as the most 
dangerous time for the body is when a cell divides, since if just one of the billions of 
cells locks into division the result is a tumor.  However, simultaneously a cell must 
divide in order to build and maintain the body, and there is a constant conflict. 
The suicide and reprieve controls have been compared to the dual-key on a 
nuclear missile [11].  The key (chemical signal) turns on cell growth but at the same 
time switches on a sequence that leads to self-destruction.  The second key overrides 
the self-destruct [11]. 
3.3 The Role of Apoptosis within Autonomic Agents 
Agent destruction has been proposed for mobile agents to facilitate security measures 
[15].  Greenberg et al. highlighted the situation simply by recalling the situation 
where the server omega.univ.edu was decommissioned, its work moving to other 
machines.  When a few years later a new computer was assigned the old name, to the 
surprise of everyone, email arrived, much of it 3 years old [16].  The mail had 
survived “pending” on Internet relays waiting for omega.univ.edu to come back up.  
 Greenberg encourages consideration of the same situation for mobile agents; 
these would not be rogue mobile agents – they would be carrying proper 
authenticated credentials.  This work would be done totally out-of-context due to 
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neither abnormal procedure nor system failure.  In this circumstance the mobile 
agent could cause substantial damage, e.g., deliver an archaic upgrade to part of the 
network operating system resulting in bringing down the entire network. 
Misuse involving mobile agents comes in the form of: misuse of hosts by agents, 
misuse of agents by hosts, and misuse of agents by other agents.   
From an agent perspective, the first is through accidental or unintentional 
situations caused by that agent (race conditions and unexpected emergent behavior), 
the latter two through deliberate or accidental situations caused by external bodies 
acting upon the agent.  The range of these situations and attacks have been 
categorized as: damage, denial-of-service, breach-of-privacy, harassment, social 
engineering, event-triggered attacks, and compound attacks.  
In the situation where portions of an agent’s binary image (e.g., monetary 
certificates, keys, information, etc.) are vulnerable to being copied when visiting a 
host, this can be prevented by encryption.  Yet there has to be decryption in order to 
execute, which provides a window of vulnerability [16].  This situation has similar 
overtones to our previous discussion on biological apoptosis, where the body is at its 
most vulnerable during cell division. 
The principles of a Hearth-Beat Monitor (HBM) and Pulse(-Beat) Monitor (PBM) 
have been established.  Heart-Beat Monitor (I am alive) is a fault-tolerant mechanism 
which may be used to safeguard the autonomic manager, and to ensure that it is still 
functioning by periodically sending ‘I am alive’ signals.  The Pulse Monitor (I am 
healthy) extends the HBM to incorporate reflex/urgency/health indicators from the 
autonomic manager, representing its view of the current self-management state.  The 
analogy is with measuring the pulse rate to determine how healthy the patient is 
instead of merely detecting its existence (and the fact that the patient is alive).  
Apoptosis (Stay alive) is a proposed additional construct used to safeguard both 
the system and agent; a signal indicates that the agent is still operating within the 
correct context and behavior, and should not self-destruct. 
Is there a role for the apoptosis metaphor in the development of autonomic 
agents? [17, 18] 
With many security issues, the lack of an agreed standard approach to agent-based 
systems prohibits, for now, further practical development of the use of apoptosis for 
agent security in a generic fashion within autonomic systems.  Later, in a subsequent 
section, we propose a certification means between agents and hosts to work around 
this. 
3.4 Autonomic Reflex Signal – Lub-Dub Pulse Emission 
The autonomic environment requires that autonomic elements and, in particular, 
autonomic managers communicate with one another concerning self-* activities, in 
order to ensure the robustness of the environment. Figure 1 illustrates that the 
autonomic manager communications (AMAM) also includes a reflex signal.  This 
may be facilitated through the additional concept of a pulse monitor—PBM (an 
extension of the embedded system’s heart-beat monitor,  or HBM, which safeguards 
vital processes through the emission of a regular ‘I am alive’ signal to another 
process, as previously described) with the capability to encode health and urgency 
signals as a pulse [10].  Together with the standard event messages on the autonomic 
communications channel, this provides dynamics within autonomic responses and 
multiple loops of control, such as reflex reactions among the autonomic managers 
[20]. 
This reflex component may be used to safeguard the autonomic element by 
communicating its health to another AE [20].   The component may also be utilized 
to communicate environmental health information [10]. For instance, in the situation 
where each PC in a LAN is equipped with an autonomic manager, rather than each 
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of the individual PCs monitoring the same environment, a few PCs (likely the least 
busy machines) may take on this role and alert the others through a change in pulse 
rate to indicate changing circumstances. 
An important aspect concerning the reflex reaction and the pulse monitor is the 
minimization of data sent – essentially only a “signal” is transmitted.  Strictly 
speaking, this is not mandatory; more information may be sent, yet the additional 
information must not compromise the reflex reaction.   For instance, in the absence 
of bandwidth concerns, information that can be acted upon quickly and not incur 
processing delays could be sent.  The important aspect is that the information must 
be in a form that can be acted upon immediately and not involve processing delays 
(such as is the case of event correlation). 
Just as the beat of the heart has a double beat (lub-dub) the autonomic element’s 
(Figure 1) pulse monitor may have a double beat encoded – as described above, a 
self health/urgency measure and an environment health/urgency measure.  These 
match directly with the two control loops within the AE, and the self-awareness and 
environment awareness properties.  
3.5 The ALice Signal 
An aspect to this research is that Anonymous Autonomous/Autonomic Agents need 
to work within the Autonomic System to facilitate self-management; as such the 
agents and their hosts need to be able to identify each other’s credentials through 
such means as an ALice (Autonomic License) signal [19].  This would allow a set of 
communications to ensure the visiting mobile agent has valid and justified reasons 
for being there as well as providing security to the visiting agent in interaction with 
other agents and host.  An unsatisfactory ALice exchange may lead to self-
destruction for self-protection. 
3.6 Biological Quiescence 
 
Figure 2 Biological Cell Cycle - including Quiescent Cell 
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The biological cell cycle is often described as a circle of cell life and division.  A cell 
divides into two “daughter cells” and both of these cells live, “eat”, grow, copy their 
genetic material and divide again producing two more daughter cells. Since each 
daughter cell has a copy of the same genes in its nucleus, daughter cells are “clones” 
of each other. This “twinning” goes on and on with each cell cycle. This is a natural 
process.  
Very fast cell cycles occur during development causing a single cell to make 
many copies of itself as it grows and differentiates into an embryo. Some very fast 
cell cycles also occur in adult animals. Hair, skin and gut cells have very fast cell 
cycles to replace cells that die naturally. While, as was highlighted earlier, some 
forms of cancer may be caused by cells cycling out of control (as well as not dying 
quickly enough). 
But there is a kind of “parking spot” in the cell cycle, called “quiescence”. A 
quiescent cell has left the cell cycle, it has stopped dividing.  Quiescent cells may re-
enter the cell cycle at some later time, or they may not; it depends on the type of cell. 
Most nerve cells stay quiescent forever. On the other hand, some quiescent cells may 
later re-enter the cell cycle in order to create more cells (for example, during 
pubescent development) [21]. 
3.7 The Role of Quiescence within Autonomic Agents 
The agent self-destruction proposed earlier (Autonomic Apoptosis) to facilitate 
security measures may be considered an extreme or ultimate self-protection measure 
– for cases when the agent’s security has been breached or the agent is endangering 
the system (for instance demonstrating undesirable emergent behavior) [17, 18].  
Yet, not all cases may require this extreme reaction.  Self-sleep (Quiescent state) 
instead of self-destruct (Apoptosis) may be all that is required for certain 
circumstances.  As the situation emerges and is clarified, the agent may resume its 
activity or be put into an apoptotic state.  
In the case of Greenberg’s authenticated mobile agent carrying an archaic 
upgrade, as described in Section 3.3, since this is a about to perform an activity that 
poses a security risk, its intrinsic nature could be such that it enters a quiescent state 
until its behavior is confirmed and before it proceeds with its activity. As was 
highlighted earlier, these situations have similar overtones to where the body is at its 
most vulnerable during cell division.   High-risk security self-managing activity can 
be protected by apoptosis and quiescence used to act as intrinsic mechanisms for 
self-destruct or self-sleep. 
4. Biologically-Inspired Concepts and Autonomicity for future 
NASA Missions 
These concepts may assist in the new radical paradigms for spacecraft design to 
facilitate adaptive operations and the move towards almost total onboard autonomy 
in certain classes of mission operations [22, 23].  
A concept mission, ANTS, Autonomous Nano-Technology Swarm, planned for 
sometime between 2020 and 2030 is viewed as a prototype for how many future 
unmanned missions will be developed and how future space exploration will exploit 
autonomous and autonomic behavior.    
The mission will involve the launch of 1000 pico-class spacecraft swarm from a 
stationary factory ship, on which the spacecraft will be assembled.  The spacecraft 
will explore the asteroid belt from close-up, something that cannot be done with 
conventionally-sized spacecraft.    
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As much as 60% to 70% of the spacecraft will be lost on first launch as they enter 
the asteroid belt.   The surviving craft will work as a swarm, forming smaller 
groupings of worker craft (each containing a unique instrument for data gathering), a 
coordinating ruler, that will use the data it receives from workers to determine which 
asteroids are of interest and to issue instructions to the workers and act as a 
coordinator, and messenger craft which will coordinate communications between the 
swarm and between the swarm and ground control.   Communications with earth will 
be limited to the download of science data and status information, and requests for 
additional craft to be launched from earth as necessary.  
Section 2 clearly highlights the general problem of agent security, whether from 
the agent’s or host’s perspective.  In terms of generic contribution to autonomic 
agent development, with many security issues the lack of an agreed standard 
approach to agent-based systems prohibits immediate further practical development 
of apoptosis and quiescent states for generic autonomic systems. 
Of course, within NASA missions, such as ANTS, we are not considering the 
generic situation.  Mission control and operations is a trusted private environment.   
This eliminates many of the wide range of agent security issues discussed earlier, 
just leaving the particular concerns: is the agent operating in the correct context and 
showing emergent behavior within acceptable parameters, where upon apoptosis and 
quiescence can make a contribution? 
For instance, in ANTS, suppose one of the worker agents was indicating incorrect 
operation, or when co-existing with other workers was the cause of undesirable 
emergent behavior, and was failing to self-heal correctly.  That emergent behavior 
(depending on what it was) may put the scientific mission in danger.  The agent may 
be put to sleep or ultimately the stay alive signal from the ruler agent would be 
withdrawn. 
If a worker, or its instrument, were damaged, either by collision with another 
worker, or (more likely) with an asteroid, or during a solar storm, a ruler could 
withdraw the stay alive signal and request a replacement worker (from Earth, if 
necessary).    If a ruler or messenger were similarly damaged, its stay alive signal 
would also be withdrawn, and a worker would be promoted to play its role.  During a 
solar storm the workers could be put into a quiescent state to protect themselves from 
damage. 
All of the spacecraft are to be powered by batteries that are recharged by the sun 
using solar sails [22, 23].   Although battery technology has greatly advanced, there 
is still a “memory loss” situation, whereby batteries that are continuously recharged 
eventually lose some of their power and cannot be recharged to full power.    After 
several months of continual operation, each of the ANTS will no longer be able to 
recharge sufficiently, at which point their ‘stay alive’ signals will be withdrawn, and 
new craft will need to be assembled or launched from Earth. 
5. Related Work 
Forrest et al. [27] in their classic work described the problem of protecting computer 
systems as a general problem of learning to distinguish self (legitimate users, 
corrupted data, etc.) from other (unauthorized users, viruses, etc.); their solution was 
a method for change detection inspired by the generation of T cells in the immune 
system  [28]. 
In relation to the Autonomic Initiative, the autonomic manager may take on this 
function of self-/non-self discrimination as part of its self-awareness in order to 
facilitate self-protection.  Yet to achieve the envisaged Autonomic Initiative long-
term vision of system-level self-direction and self-management requires a high level 
of interaction among AMs; and since AMs at the local level will view their world as 
self, activity from the external environment may be perceived from a local AM view 
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as others/non-selfs.  (In the greater scheme of things, all these legitimate self-
management activities will actually be self as opposed to other/non-self but the sheer 
vastness of systems of systems could result in a local AM perception/classification 
that these legitimate activities are of other/non-self).  As such, the work described in 
this paper is complementary to Forrest et al’s research.  In our approach, the ALice 
concept is used to identify and distinguish agents from the external environment, 
indeed part of the greater self as opposed to other/non-self.  Additionally, 
complementary biological inspiration is derived from apoptosis and quiescence for 
intrinsic mechanisms to facilitate correct operation by self (for instance avoiding 
undesirable emergent behavior) and not just to distinguish self from non-self/other. 
6. Conclusions 
Autonomic agents have been gaining ground as a significant approach to facilitate 
the creation of self-managing systems to deal with the ever increasing complexity 
and costs inherent in today’s and tomorrow’s systems. 
In terms of the Autonomic Systems initiative, agent technologies have the 
potential to become an intrinsic approach within the initiative [24], not only as an 
enabler (e.g., ABLE agent toolkit [25]), but also in terms of creating autonomic agent 
environments. 
Apoptosis was introduced and previously discussed in [17].  We have extended 
this here with Autonomic Quiescence—self-sleep, a less drastic form of self-
protection. 
We have briefly described research into biologically-inspired concepts to be used 
together as intrinsic mechanisms within agents to provide inherent safety and 
security both at the agent and system level.  We briefly discussed this in terms of the 
NASA concept mission, ANTS.  More detailed accounts of the ANTS mission are 
given in [23] and [26].  We continue to seek inspiration for modeling and developing 
computer-based systems from ideas that are observed in nature. 
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Toward a Unified Safety/Security Model 
The worlds of safety and security have 
co-existed for some time, yet remain 
largely separate domains with limited 
interactions.  This is, to put it mildly, a 
problem.  Each domain has contributions 
for the other and more dependable 
systems being a significant benefit of 
working together.  Yet one element that 
has continued to separate these domains 
is lack of a common language and 
taxonomy for discussing risks associated 
with safety and with security.  This 
articles proposes a common risk 
taxonomy framework that bridges the 
existing security and safety risk 
frameworks; producing one common 
expression readily applicable in either 
domain. 
 
Cooperation between safety and security 
communities enable mutual support 
toward the common goal of achieving 
systems that are dependable in a real 
world where they are exposed to events 
that can result in harm.  This includes 
harm to: 
 Individuals, be it health and life 
(safety) or loss of privacy, monetary 
loss, or harm to image or reputation 
(security issues), 
 Assets (generally a security issue yet 
also a safety issue), and 
 Organizations; for example, an 
organization’s mission, function, 
image, or reputation (security 
issues). 
 
Safety and security share common 
concerns within the list of potential 
harmful events above.  Specifically, the 
security events that can result in loss of 
life or health are clearly also safety 
concerns.  Moreover, the processes in 
place for addressing safety presume a 
probabilistic distribution for failures that 
could lead to safety.  This is a 
fundamental, underlying assumption for 
all safety processes that does not hold 
for intelligent attacks.  Hence 
cooperation between the domains of 
safety and security is essential for safety 
to be achieved in the real world of high 
dependence on information systems 
subject to attack by malicious, capable 
adversaries. 
 
The domain of security can benefit at 
least as much from cooperation.  In 
many instances organizations have 
inculcated a culture of safety-
consciousness that truly impacts the 
decisions being made.  That cannot be 
said as often for security, where the 
functional gains to be achieved by 
automation frequently overwhelm 
concerns about risks to individuals, the 
organization, and its assets.  Too often 
the question of ‘how much security is 
enough?’ is answered by how much 
effort has been expended with seemingly 
little regard for the remaining risks 
arising from the automation of 
mission/business processes.  Wherever a 
safety culture already exists, bringing 
common expression to the safety and 
security risks can be expected to enhance 
understanding of the security issues and 
facilitate security/function tradeoffs 
being done in a manner consistent with 
that already being implement for safety 
issues. 
 
A generally accepted risk taxonomy for 
security can be found in the U.S. Federal 
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guidance on risk management in 
National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) Special Publication 
800-30, Risk Management Guide for 
Information Technology Systems, July 
2002 
(http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpub
s/800-30/sp800-30.pdf).  The security 
taxonomy captured in this document is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
 
A common risk taxonomy for the safety 
community is found in Federal Aviation 
Administration Order 8040.4, Appendix 
G, Safety Risk Management, June 1998 
(http://www.faa.gov/library/manuals/avi
ation/risk_management/ss_handbook/me
dia/app_g_1200.PDF).  This taxonomy 
is shown in Figure 2. 
 
While the two taxonomies are enough 
different to reinforce the separation 
between the two domains, there is a 
significant amount of potential overlap, 
requiring no significant change to the 
safety terminology other than providing 
for an extension to what types of events 
constitute hazards.  A common 
taxonomy can be achieved simply by 
enlarging the safety term ‘hazard’ and 
adopting a unified definition for the term 
‘mishap’.   
 
The current safety definition for ‘hazard’ 
is:  “Condition, event, or circumstance 
that could lead to or contribute to an 
unplanned or undesired event.” [FAA 
Order 8040.4].  This definition can be 
broad enough to also incorporate the 
security incidents classed as ‘threats’ in 
NIST SP 800-30; as these certainly are 
part of the ‘condition, event, or 
circumstance’ that leads to an ‘undesired 
event’. 
 
With regard to a ‘mishap’, the current 
definitions for mishap and threat are: 
 
Mishap: Unplanned event, or series of 
events, that results in death, injury, 
occupational illness, or damage to or 
loss of equipment or property. [FAA 
Order 8040.4] 
 
Threat: The potential for a threat-
source to exercise (accidentally trigger 
or intentionally exploit) a specific 
vulnerability. [NIST SP 800-30] 
 
A suggested unified definition for the 
term ‘mishap’ is: 
 
Mishap: Unified safety/security 
definition: Unplanned event, or series 
of events, that results in death, injury, 
occupational illness, or other harm to 
individuals well-being (to include 
privacy, finances, image, and 
reputation); damage to or loss of 
equipment or property; or harm to an 
organization (mission, function, image, 
or reputation).  These events include 
system/equipment/component failures, 
requirement/design/implementation 
flaws, user errors, and intentional 
attacks. 
 
With this unified definition for “mishap” 
and the incorporation of security 
incidents into the term ‘hazard’, a 
unified security/safety taxonomy is 
readily obtained as shown in Figure 3. 
 
A common taxonomy for addressing 
risks is an important practical element of 
bringing the domains of safety and 
security together into an effective, 
mutually-supporting relationship.  The 
proposed unified, risk taxonomy 
provides this common expression and 
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does so with limited change to existing 
taxonomies.   
 
Both safety and security have much to 
gain by working together. Security can 
piggy-backing on the work done within 
the safety community in developing 
definitions and terminology to express 
hazard conditions and in establishing 
organizational awareness of need to 
trade function for other, important 
concerns.  The safety community can 
take advantage of the work done by 
security in dealing with intelligent 
maliciousness which is not well 
addressed by the probabilistic 
assumptions that underlie safety 
processes and yet is now a significant 
concern with regard to safety.  A risk 
framework has been proposed to help 
make the idea of working together more 
than just an idea, but a reality. 
 
 
Figure 1: Security Risk Framework (NIST SP 800-30) 
 
Security Model 
(NIST SP 800-30, 2002) 
Flaw 
Vulnerability 
Weakness, error, or unexpected 
interaction arising in policy, 
requirements, development, 
implementation, or operation 
Flaw that can be exercised (intentionally 
exploited or unintentionally triggered), leading 
to harm to individuals, organization, or assets 
Threat-Source 
Human or event with capability to 
exercise a vulnerability; achieving 








Risk = Net impact = impact * likelihood 
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Figure 2: Safety Risk Framework (FAA ORDER 8040.4, Appendix G) 
 
Safety Model 
(FAA ORDER 8040.4, Appendix G, 1998)  
Hazard 
Mishap 
The occurrence of a specific hazard 
event with likelihood and resulting 
impact 
Risk 
Risk = Net impact = impact * likelihood 
Condition, event, or circumstance 
that could lead to or contribute to an 
unplanned or undesired event. 
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Figure 2: Unified Safety/Security Risk Framework 
 
Unified Safety/Security Model 
Existing Safety Model 
From Existing Security Model 
Flaw 
Vulnerability 
Weakness, error, or 
unexpected interaction 













Human or event with 
capability to exercise a 
vulnerability; achieving 
harm to person, 
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hazard event with likelihood 
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Safety – Security Coexisting/Independent
 The worlds of safety and security have co-existed for some 
time
 Common goal of achieving systems that are dependable in a 
real world where they are exposed to events that can result 
in harm
 Yet remain largely separate domains with limited 
interactions. 




 A common risk taxonomy framework
 Bridge the existing security and safety risk frameworks
 Common expression readily applicable in either domain. 
Heritage Style Viewgraphs4
Value of a seeking a common taxonomy
 One element that has continued to separate safety and security domains is 
lack of a common language and taxonomy for discussing risks
 Facilitate mutual support toward the common goal of achieving systems that 
are dependable in a real world where they are exposed to events that can 
result in harm
 Each domain has contributions for the other and more dependable systems 
being a significant benefit of working together. 
 Safety benefits from security: Fundamental, underlying assumptions for 
safety processes do not hold for purposeful attacks – security addresses 
purposeful maliciousness
 Security benefits from safety: Some organizations have inculcated a culture 
of safety-consciousness that truly impacts the decisions being made –




NIST SP 800-30, 2002
Flaw
Vulnerability
Weakness, error, or unexpected interaction 
arising in policy, requirements, development, 
implementation, or operation
Flaw that can be exercised (intentionally 
exploited or unintentionally triggered), leading to 
harm to individuals, organization, or assets
Threat-Source
Human or event with capability to exercise 
a vulnerability; achieving harm to person, 
organization, or assets
+




Risk = Net impact = impact * likelihoodFYI: SP 800-30 Rev 1 (draft) 
moving toward attack path instead 
of individual vulnerabilities
FYI: SP 800-30 Rev 1 (draft) 




FAA ORDER 8040.4, Appendix G, 1998
Hazard
Mishap
The occurrence of a specific hazard event 
with likelihood and resulting impact
Risk
Risk = Net impact = impact * likelihood
Condition, event, or circumstance 
that could lead to or contribute to 




 Hazard: No change to text of existing safety definition, just 
incorporate into current understanding of safety ‘undesired events’
the events classed as ‘threats’ in NIST SP 800-30.  [Rationale: 
These ‘security’ events certainly are part of the ‘condition, event, or 
circumstance’ that leads to an ‘undesired’ safety event.]
 Mishap: Unified safety/security definition: Unplanned event, or 
series of events, that results in (a) death, injury, occupational 
illness, or other harm to individuals well-being (to include privacy, 
finances, image, and reputation); (b) damage to or loss of 
equipment or property; or (c) harm to an organization (mission, 
function, image, or reputation).  These events include failures,





The occurrence of a specific hazard 
event with likelihood and resulting impact
Safety condition, event, or circumstance 
that could lead to or contribute to an 
unplanned or undesired event.
Mishap
Risk
Risk = Net impact = impact * likelihood
From Existing Security Model
Flaw
Vulnerability
Weakness, error, or 
unexpected interaction 
arising in policy, 
requirements, development, 
implementation, or operation
Flaw that can be exercised 
(intentionally exploited or 
unintentionally triggered), leading 
to harm to individuals, 
organization, or assets
Threat-Source
Human or event with 
capability to exercise a 
vulnerability; achieving 











Opinions expressed here are those solely of Jeffrey Voas, and not necessarily those of SAIC.
Talk Outline
 I.  Basic Principles Framing Software Assurance
 II. The Role of Standards and Certification in Software 
Assurance Puzzle
 III. The Technical and Financial Trade-off Issues of the 
Attribute “ilities”
 IV. A little slide presentation
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Dispel the Myths That Say…
 1.Software Assurance is Secure software
 2. Software Assurance is Computer security
 3. Software Assurance is Information assurance
 4. Software Assurance is guaranteed using Standards
 5. Software Assurance is Well-defined, Framed, and Bounded
Stress the Idea That …
1. Software assurance is always a function of time,
2. Software today is less and less viewed as a product, it is more viewed 
as a service, and therefore service assurance and resilience are vital 
to contemplate,
3. Software assurance is a non-boundable problem, except in rare cases, 
such as embedded systems.
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Well-defined, framed, and bounded?
Software
1




























































Simply lines in the sand from which a certificate 
of compliance or non-compliance can occur.
Point 1: Standards and Certification are logically 
inseparable.
Point 2: If you cannot certify against a standard, 
why have a standard? Question: For hand 
waving? 
Point 3: C&A
Software Engineering Standards for Assurance
Three Key Messages That Certification 
Against A Standard Can Convey
 Compliance with development process standards vs.
 Fitness for purpose vs.
 Compliance with the requirements
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Premise for Software Engineering Standards
Acquired software should be tagged 
with some guarantee (or at least a “warm fuzzy”) as to how 
“good” the software is.
Problem: Software Of Unknown Pedigree (SOUP)
Goal of Software Engineering Standards: SOKP
Problem: How good is “good enough”?
“A consumer [patient] may not be able to assess accurately 
whether a particular drug is safe, but [they] can be reasonably 
confident that drugs obtained from approved sources have the 
endorsement of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
which confers important safety information.  Computer system 
trustworthiness has nothing comparable to the FDA.  The  
problem is both the absence of standard metrics and a 
generally accepted organization that could conduct 
such assessments.  There is no Consumer Reports for 
Trustworthiness.”
[Source: “Trust in Cyberspace,” National Academy of Sciences report, National Academy Press, 1998.]
State-of-the-Practice/Art
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Regardless, There are Many!
 Hundreds of software engineering and software quality standards are 
in existence, but relatable?  Good luck. 
 Terminology: Methodologies, Taxonomies, Ontologies, 
 Software standards are generally tied to: (1) risk management, (2) 
project management, (3) systems engineering, (4) software 
engineering, (5) languages, and (6) life-cycle phases and artifacts
 References:
 Software Safety and Reliability, Debra S. Herrmann, IEEE 
Computer Society Press, 1999.
 Software Engineering Standards, James W. Moore, IEEE 
Computer Society Press, 1998.
 Guide to Software Engineering Standards and Specifications, 
Stan Magee and Leonard L. Tripp, Artech House, 1997.
Question 1: 
Are Prescriptive Standards worth the costs?,i.e., Do 
They Offer Return on Investment?




Any bar or hurdle is better than
no  bar or hurdle
Cons
Possibly the developers would have done more
to improve quality but now feel they have a 
license to do less.




What Data Do You Have to Support Certifying 
Against a Standard
Information to support the creation of certificates should be 
based on a claims-evidence-arguments framework (Adelard, 
U.K.), much as is done in courts of law.
Goal Structuring Notation (U. of York, U.K.)
Arguments and Evidence and Claims
 Supporting Evidence: Results from 
observing, analyzing, testing, simulating and 
estimating the properties of a system that 
provide the fundamental information from 
which a claim (i.e., certificate) can be made
 High Level Argument: Explanation of how  
the available evidence can be reasonably 
interpreted as indicating acceptability for use 
(Fitness for Purpose), usually be 
demonstrating Compliance with 
Requirements
 Argument without Evidence is unfounded
 Evidence without Argument is unexplained
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Basic Argument Structure
Claim: what we want to show
Argument: why we believe the claim is met, based on






 Purpose of a goal structure:  To show how goals are broken 
down into sub-goals, and eventually supported by evidence, 
while making clear the strategies adopted, the rationale for the 
approach (assumptions, justifications), and the context in 
which the goals are stated. 
 Similar to a process flow chart 
 Excellent for defining all processes that must be performed 
during development prior to contract award; thus useful for 
certification as well as acquisition.
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Standards Are Not Perfect
 Vague:  Develop software that only does "good" things
 Common sense "dos" and "don'ts"   - Very watered done by 
voting time
 Disclaimers by publishing organizations
 Profitable to organization that publishes them
 Used only if mandated
 Return-on-investment is often un-quantified
 Thwart intellectual creativity 
 "Protectionist" legislation
 Paperwork
 2167A: ~400 English words per Ada code statement
 "Old news" before being ratified (5-10 actual years)
 Relating one to another is very hard
 Hundreds in existence
Standards are Not Perfect (cont)
 Different interpretations
 Process certifications are just documentation checks unless 
personnel remain on site during the assessment
 Re-certification
 Client:  over 300 modifications to a safety-critical medical 
device that never requested re-certification for any of those 
mods.
 Cannot be easily tested for compliance
 Mis-certifications are common
 Lack of fairness during certification judgment
 FDA Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) 
 So much legacy functionality exists that complies with no 







one or more 
of these 
perspectives




1. Process: Clean Pipes, Dirty Water?
Certifying that you 
know how to do 
things correctly does 
not mean that you do 
them correctly!
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A Fool with a Tool is Still a Fool!
2. People
3. Product: The Software Itself
Spectrum of possibilities as to what a certificate proclaiming that some 
“quantified” level of quality has been built in  could state --- it  could say 
anything in the range between “Nothing” (e.g., “here is a piece of software”, 
etc.) to “This software will always work perfectly under all conditions” (i.e., a 






And So How Should a Standard Be Selected?
Four Principles
1. People, Process, Product view?  With respect to an 
Environment?
2. Which Attribute(s) is of interest?
3. When in the Life-Cycle will the standard be applied, and to 
which artifacts? 
























Software’s QoS interoperability is some 
combination of: 
(1) the degree to which the functional
requirements are met, as well as, (2) the 
degree to which the non-functional
requirements are met.
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Attributes Need to Be Pre-Defined
 Requirements should prescribe at some level of granularity as 
to what the weights are for various “ilities”, as well as how 
much of each “ility” is desired.   
 But HOW?
 Ignoring the  attributes is not an option for achieving high 
assurance and trustworthy systems! 
Weighting Is Important
w1R w2P w3F w4Sa
w5Se w6A w7T w8M
in order to not over-design any attribute into the system.
For example, for an web-based transaction processing 
application, w4 would probably equal 0.0 and w7 would also 
be less than something like w2
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Tradeoffs
How much will you spend for increased reliability 
knowing that doing so will take needed, financial
resources away from security or performance or …?
 Security vs. Performance
 Fault tolerance vs. Testability




 100% safety and 0% reliability
 100% reliability and 0% safety
 0% functionality/reliability and 100% security
 100% availability and 0% reliability
 100% availability and 0% performance
 0% performance and 100% safety
Common Sense Rules
 Consider what you want demonstrated before selecting an existing standard
 Know which “ilities” or assurances you are most concerned about
 Then, perform a risk/consequence analysis up front defining what failures modes are 
intolerable
 Consider the ROI of various standards 
 There are hundreds of standards, and more are published/revised each year
 Do not assume good people  = good code
 Do not assume good process  = good code
 Work with qualified certification authorities or acquisition agents
 Recognize that documentation can be faked to fool a certifier
 No standard is perfect – blending is good
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Conclusions
• The 7 key components of the assurance problem well-bound the 
space.
• Software engineering standards are necessary but insufficient.
• The “ilities” are a huge piece of the puzzle
Contact Information
Jeffrey Voas, PhD
Director, Systems Assurance Technologies
SAIC















For those of you who may 
be involved in project cost 
control (at whatever level), 
148
please read this quote from a 
Petrobras executive, 
extolling the benefits of 
cutting quality assurance 
and inspection costs, 
149
on the project that 
was deployed in the 
Atlantic Ocean off the 
coast of Brazil in 
March 2001.
"Petrobras has established new global benchmarks 
for the generation of exceptional shareholder wealth 
150
through an aggressive and innovative program of 
cost cutting on its P36 production facility. 
Conventional constraints have been successfully challenged 
151
and replaced with new paradigms appropriate to the 
globalized corporate market place. 
Through an integrated network of 
facilitated workshops, 
152
the project successfully rejected: (1)  the established constricting 
and negative influences of prescriptive engineering, 
(2) onerous quality requirements, 
and (3) outdated concepts of 
inspection and client control. 
153
Elimination of these unnecessary straitjackets has empowered the
project's suppliers and contractors to propose highly economical
solutions, 
with the win-win bonus of enhanced 
profitability margins for themselves. 
154
The P36 platform shows the shape of things to come 
in the unregulated global market economy of the 21st Century.”
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And now you have seen the final result of 
this proud achievement by Petrobras.
QUIZ:
1. How many lives were lost to this cost saving effort and how did 
this impact the environment, needlessly?
2. Did the person giving this speech or anyone in upper 
management connected with this decision lose their job/bonus?
3. How much did Petrobras really save?
4. Does your company feel the same way about QA?  If so, you’d 
better know how to swim.
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